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Corporate Criminal Liability Under The Criminal 
Laws of Jordan and Australia: A Comparative Analysis• 
 
Dr. Mouaid Al-Qudah∗ 
Abstract: 
The current theory of corporate criminal accountability in Jordan focuses 
upon the individuals who make-up an organization. However, building our legal 
thinking around this approach, known as the identification doctrine, based on 
individual fault has its limitations. Corporations are not individuals nor can they 
be reduced to mere aggregation of their constituent human agents; rather their 
formation, structure, activities, policies and whole existence mark them as social 
structures in their own rights. The present paper provides a comparative analysis 
of corporate criminal liability in Jordan (a civil law jurisdiction) and Australia (a 
common law jurisdiction). It maps out some of the key developments in relation 
to the grounds of such liability (as proposed by some scholars) which concentrate 
on the organization itself based on the concept of "organizational" rather than 
"individual" blameworthiness. The paper is divided into two parts. In the fist 
part, it provides a theoretical comparative account of the problems surrounding 
corporate liability along with an analysis of the various bases of such liability. 
The second part of the paper takes a more serious approach to corporate liability. 
It uses the notion of "corporate culture" to argue for the extension of the theory 
of committing an offence by an innocent or non-responsible agent so as to allow 
the inclusion of situations involving crimes committed by a non-autonomous 
employee under "economic duress" when these offences are proven to have been 
caused by corporate negligent manipulation of the workforce. This is crucial if 
we must take very serious account of the radical disparities and real autonomy 
and freedom of choice across the social structure.  The paper also argues that 
corporate "direct" criminal liability is better grounded in a principle of 
"organizational" rather than "individual" fault combined with a notion of strict 
liability with various possible patterns of corporate punishments considered. 
                                      
•  Approved for publication on 3/1/2008 . 
∗  BA (Yarmouk University/Jordan), LLM (University of Jordan), PhD (University of Western 
Sydney/ Australia). Assistant Professor in Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, Yarmouk University. 
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Much of the difficulty surrounding the issue of corporate criminal liability 
lies in the fact that it challenges some of the basic principles and assumptions 
underlying criminal law and criminal responsibility. In particular, a consideration 
of corporate criminal accountability is largely confined within a paradigm of 
individualistic conceptions of liability according to which criminal liability is 
primarily understood in terms of individual free decision and action or inaction. 
The current model of corporate liability in Jordan, based upon vicarious liability 
and the doctrine of identification, is a reflection of this individualistic model. 
Although it is not suggested that this model should be abandoned, it has 
nonetheless been the object of much criticism. Critics in Australia find that this 
model of individualism provides an incomplete basis upon which to ground 
corporate criminal liability as it does not accurately capture the collective nature 
of corporate blameworthiness. It is, therefore, thought necessary not to retain our 
legal thinking captive to the individualistic model of liability as far as 
corporations are concerned. Rather, it is important to explore an alternative basis 
of such liability that seeks to lay criminal liability on the basis of corporate 
blameworthiness, incorporating the realities of modern organizations. 
Given this focus, this paper provides a theoretical comparative analysis of 
corporate criminal liability(1) under the criminal laws of Jordan (a civil law 
jurisdiction) and Australia (a common law jurisdiction). It addresses the basis of 
such liability, and explores the extent to which the traditional foundations of 
criminal liability can form an appropriate basis for corporate criminal liability. 
The paper does not, however, attempt to provide a "clear-cut" answer to such 
major issues; rather it intends to map out some of the key developments of 
corporate criminal liability [as advocated by western legal scholars and adopted 
by their laws] to provide insight into how this comparative analysis might 
enhance the current model of corporate criminal liability in Jordan in respect of 
any potential law reform in relation to this contentious issue. 
To this end, this paper is divided into two parts.  The first part provides a 
comparative theoretical account of the problems surrounding the attribution of 
corporate criminal liability. Two matters are considered in this respect: (1) 
Individualism as a basis of criminal liability; and (2) the attribution of criminal 
culpability to corporations through an analysis of the various grounds of such 
liability. Central to the purpose of this part is to explore the possible bases of 
corporate "direct" rather than "vicarious" responsibility, and to demonstrate that 
                                      
(1)  This paper considers 'corporate criminal liability' rather than other 'non-human legal persons'. 
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the adoption of an individualistic approach to corporate liability is problematic. 
The second part considers three matters regarding corporate liability: (1) 
Corporate "culture" and the limits of criminal law; (2) combining the 
organizational doctrine with the notion of strict liability; and (3) corporate 
punishment. In the concluding section, a summary of the main findings of the 
paper is provided along with some suggestions for consideration by lawmakers 
in relation to corporate criminal liability.  
2. Part One: The Problem of attributing Criminal Responsibility to 
Corporations 
There are two major problems of accountability confronting criminal law in 
its attempt to address the commission of wrongful acts by large scale 
corporations(2). First, the principles of criminal liability are traditionally 
constructed around the notion of individualism. That is, individuals can commit 
offences but corporations do not, and therefore human individuals are considered 
the primary subject of criminal law. Secondly, where corporations are sanctioned 
for the commission of an offence, the imposition of meaningful sanctions is 
central to the utility of effective corporate criminal liability. Usually, the types of 
punishments which can be imposed on corporations are confined to fines or other 
monetary penalties.  [This point will be discussed further below in part two]. The 
following discussion intends to highlight how the adoption of the individualistic 
model of liability is problematic in relation to corporate criminal liability.  
2.1. Individualism as a Basis of Criminal Liability 
In both Jordan and Australia, criminal liability is primarily understood in 
terms of free individual decision and action or inaction. As Hart points out "the 
principle of punishment should be restricted to those who have voluntarily 
broken the law"(3).  From this perspective, the essential role of criminal law is to 
protect the socially permissible free actions of individuals [centred upon their 
enjoyment of their life and property] through punitive re-direction of the anti-
social free choices of others(4). This emphasis upon "free individual choice" as a 
ground of criminal culpability finds expression in the requirement of establishing 
                                      
(2)  For more discussion see for example, Fisse B & Braithwaite J, ‘The Allocation of Responsibility for 
Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability’ (1988) 11 Syd LR 468 at 469-
513. 
(3)  Hart H L A, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1968 at p 181. 
(4)  Mann S & Al-Qudah M, "Freedom of the Will and Criminal Culpability" (2004) 8 University of 
Western Sydney Law Review 97. 
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that the accused's guilty mind [or mens rea] has caused a particular criminal 
action or inaction [or the actus reus](5).  The question which arises in this context 
is: did the individual really intend [or have any mental state] to perform the 
action in question, and did their intention really cause them to commit the act?(6)  
The term "action" here refers to the voluntary or intentional bodily 
movement, that is, a physical movement which is the result of the individual's 
"free will" (7). Hart describes this as a bodily movement subordinate to the agent 
conscious plan of action(8).  It also includes the individual's deliberate omission 
to act when he or she is under a duty to do so (9). As Norrie says: 
An omission can be described as a negative act, a description which 
indicates that omissions are in their essence similar to rather than different from 
acts. Omission can be a conscious decision either not to do something or to do 
other thing than the thing that is not done…either way, to describe a failure to act 
is as much to describe a practical orientation to the world as is the description of 
an act(10). 
The mens rea, on the other hand, has come to refer to a range of different 
state of minds including intention(11), knowledge(12), recklessness(13) and 
                                      
(5)  It is acknowledged that the criminal laws in both Jordan and Australia recognize the limits to the 
individual's free will by allowing a range of defences to operate so as to exculpate individuals from 
criminal responsibility. For example, under both legal systems various defences are recognized such 
as duress: Article 88 of the JPC; R v Hurley [1967] VR 529; McCafferty [1974] 1 NSWLR. Insanity: 
Articles 91 and 92 of the JPC; McNaghten Case (1843) 10 C1 &Fin 200; R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 
182.  Necessity: Article 89 of the JPC; R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443; Rogers (1996) A Crim R 542. 
(6)  Mann and Al-Qudah, supra 2004 at p 94.  
(7)   Mann and Al-Qudah, supra 2004 at p 94; Alseid K, Explanation of the General Principles in the 
Penal Code of Jordan: Comparative Study: Crime, Criminal Participation, Criminal Liability and 
punishment, The Arabic Centre for Students Services, Jordan, 2002 at p 204. 
(8)  Hart, 1968 supra at p 181. 
(9)  Alseid, 2002 supra at p 205-209. 
(10)  Norrie A, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, Butterworths, 
United Kingdom, 2001 at p121. 
(11)  He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523; Article 63 of the JPC which states that "intention is the will to 
commit a crime as defined by the law". 
(12)  He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523; Saad (1987) 29 A Crim R 20. In Jordan, the requirement of 
knowledge of the proscribed facts on the part of the offender is understood from the wording of 
Articles 86 and 87 of the JPC, which lay down the effect of mistaken facts in relation to criminal 
liability. Article 86 states: 
 (1)  Whoever commits an intentional offence under a mistake in one of its components shall not be 
punished as a perpetrator or inciter or accessory;  
(2)  If the mistake is related to one of the aggregative circumstances, the offender shall not be 
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negligence(14) under the laws of Jordan and Australia. However, unlike Jordan, in 
Australia, criminal liability can be attributed to individuals on the basis of strict 
liability in situations involving statutory offences which are enacted without any 
reference to mens rea (15).  The notion of strict liability exists under the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (CCA) which provides that: 
6.1 (1) if a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an 
offence of strict liability: 
(a)  There are no faults element for any of the physical elements of the 
offence; and 
(b)  The defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available. 
(2)  If a law that creates an offence provides that strict liability applies to a 
particular physical element of the offence: 
(a)  There are no fault elements for that physical element; and 
(b)  The defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available in relation 
to that physical element. 
(3)  The existence of strict liability does not make any other defence 
                                                                                                    
responsible for that circumstance.  
Article 87 specifies that "A mistake which relates to the act of an unintentional offence precludes 
liability provided it is not the production of the offender’s fault" 
(13)  R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696; Crabble (1985)156 CLR 464. 
(14)  Nydam [1977] VR 430; Wilson v The Queen (1992) 274 CLR 313; Article 64 of the JPC which 
provides that "a crime is intentional even though the result has exceeded the intention of the offender 
if he or she has expected its occurrence and accepted the risk. If the harmful consequences are the 
result of negligence, recklessness or non-observance of the laws and regulations on the side of the 
accused, then the form of mens rea is fault". 
(15)  For example, In the criminal case of Wampfler  (1987) 11 NSWLR 541 at p546, Street Chief Justice 
summarized the categories of mens rea for statutory offence as follows:   
(1) Those in which there is an original obligation on the prosecution to prove mens rea. 
(2) Those in which mens rea will be presumed to be present unless and until material is advanced by the 
defence of the existence of honest and reasonable belief that the conduct in question in not criminal 
in which case the prosecution must undertake the burden of negativing such belief beyond 
reasonable doubt. [this refers to strict liability] 
(3) Those in which mens rea plays no part and guilt is established by proof of the objective ingredients 
of the offence. [this refers to absolute liability] 
In cases involving absolute liability, criminal liability can be imposed without requiring proof of any 
mental state with the accused cannot use the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact to 
negate his or her liability according the section (6.2/1) of the CCA. The accused can however, rely 
on other defences [such as duress or insanity] to avoid criminal liability (section 6.2/3) of the CCA. 
5
Al Qudat: ????????? ???????? ??????? ????? ????????? ???????? ?? ?????? ????????? : ????? ??????? ??????
Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2009
 
Dr. Mouaid Al-Qudah  
 
 













So, according to the CCA, criminal liability can be imposed without any 
proof of fault on the part of the accused. But it has to be proved that the accused 
has acted consciously and voluntarily for his or her liability to stand(16). The 
accused can, however, use the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact 
to negative his or her liability. In both Jordan and Australia, the underlying 
notion is that of a responsible individual who has chosen, in some ways, to break 
the law(17). In this regard, Article 74/1 of the Jordanian Penal Code 1960 No 16 
(JPC) states that "no-one shall be punished for an act unless he or she 
consciously and voluntarily has committed that act". Similarly, the Australian 
Common law cases(18) impose criminal liability where the action constituting the 
physical element of the crime is "willed and voluntary".  This involves conscious 
"prior decision" to break the law, and it does also include the intention to engage 
in an action, which the individual knows [or at least foresees], involving a 
chance of causing a prohibited result. Consciousness is therefore a necessary 
condition of criminal culpability. It is not merely consciousness in the broad 
sense in which animals as well as humans are aware of their surrounding and 
experiencing feeling of various kinds. It is, rather, consciousness in the narrow 
sense of being, as a human, "capable" to stand back from his or her mental state 
and think about them, appraise and evaluate them(19). As Quaid notes "it is the 
capacity to be blamed- and therefore punished- which animates our conception 
of the notion of responsibility"(20).  
The rationale of criminal liability and consequently punishment is crucially 
dependent upon these ideas. Thus, an argument can be framed as follows: 
because the offender has freely chosen to break the law, so he or she has 
therefore, in a sense, chosen to expose themselves to the possible infliction of 
                                      
(16)  See for example, Ryan v R (1966) 121 CLR 205; Jiminiz v R (1992) 173 CLR 572. 
(17)  t is understood that criminal liability is not only imposed on the basis of subjective standards of 
mens rea such as intentions but it is also imposed on the ground of the objective standards [that is, 
negligence]. But in all cases, the accused needs to chose, at the minimum, his or her wrongful action 
or inaction before criminal liability can be attributed to him or her. His state of mind toward the 
consequence of his or her conduct plays a crucial role in determining whether he or she should be 
liable for the commission of an intentional or non-intentional offence. 
(18)  See for example: Ryan v R (1966) 121 CLR; Jiminez v R (1992) 173 CLR 572; He Kaw Teh (1985) 
157 CLR 525. 
(19)  Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p98. 
(20)  Quaid J A, "The Assessment of Corporate Criminal Liability on the Basis of Corporate Identity: An 
Analysis" (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 67 at p 70. 
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pain by the state as the cost of the suffering they have inflicted upon others(21). In 
the western literature of ethic and philosophy of mind, these sorts of issues and 
notions are traditionally discussed in terms of "individual autonomy" or "self-
governance"(22). Moral philosophers(23) distinguish three different dimensions of 
autonomy along with different kinds of possible restrictions to such autonomy. 
First of all, there is autonomy as "liberty of actions". In this sense, an individual 
is autonomous if his or her action or inaction results from their conscious 
intention and is not the result of any external coercion or duress. They provide 
the example of an individual sitting under a tree, no-one is forcing him or her to 
sit under the tree. He or she is free to leave anytime he or she chooses. Therefore, 
his or her action results from their conscious intention to sit under the tree or 
leave. As has been pointed out: 
When autonomy is identified with liberty of action, the primary contrast 
drawn is between autonomy and coercion. Coercion involves the deliberate use 
of force or the threat of harm. The coercer's purpose is to get the person coerced 
to do something he or she would not otherwise be willing to do(24). 
Secondly, there is autonomy as "freedom of choice". This refers to the range 
of "real choices" actually available to an individual in terms of access to material 
means for the realization of particular goals or desires. To illustrate this, the 
authors consider the example of an individual seeking a vasectomy. Local 
doctors refuse to perform the operation and he cannot afford to travel further. 
Therefore, the individual is not free to act upon his decision. His lack of freedom 
is not due to duress, rather his autonomy is limited in the sense that his range of 
choices is narrowed. In this regard, intention is viewed as part of causation of 
action. Such intention, however, can only become operative in effective ways if 
the individual in question has effective control of the necessary resources of 
skill, knowledge, tools, finance, machines, assistance and opportunity.   
Thirdly, there is autonomy as "effective deliberation".  This refers to the 
"internal" rather than "external" resources available for the exercise of individual 
autonomy. In particular, it refers to the individual's "capacity" for making 
rational and informed decision. In this sense, autonomy is allied with rationality, 
and an individual is characterized as one who is capable of making rational and 
                                      
(21)  Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p98. 
(22)  For more discussion on this issue see for example Ashworth A, Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd ed, 
Oxford University Press, New york, 1999 at 27-29. 
(23) Mappes T A & DeGrazia D, Biomedical Ethics, McGraw-Hill, Inc, New York, 1996 at p25-28. 
(24)   Mappes and DeGrazia, 1996 supra at p 25. 
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unconstraint decisions and acting accordingly. On one hand, an individual is 
described as rational when he or she is capable of choosing the best means to 
some chosen ends. For a person to be regarded as a rational individual, he or she 
has to be capable of reasoning well on the basis of good evidence about the best 
means to achieve some ends. It also entails being able to choose the appropriate 
timing to achieve any chosen goals. On the other hand, an individual is described 
as rational if he or she is capable of choosing appropriate ends, although what 
counts as appropriate ends is a notorious matter of dispute. Briefly, an individual 
is autonomous only to the extent that he or she possesses the abilities necessary 
for effective deliberation and reasoning, free of internal constraints to exercise 
those abilities, and is neither coerced by others nor has his or her range of 
options narrowed by them.  As Mappes and DeGrazia state, 
These abilities can be limited in many ways. When they are, decisions and 
actions may be less than fully rational. First, some individuals may not have 
sufficiently developed the necessary abilities or may even be incapable of 
sufficiently developing them. Second, even individuals who have the requisite 
abilities may be unable to exercise them on a particular occasion due to various 
internal factors. For example, emotions such as fear may make the impartial 
weighing of information impossible… the presence of pain or the use of drug 
may also affect the exercise of reasoning abilities. It may be best, therefore, to 
speak of degrees of rationality and irrationality since many factors can make 
decisions and actions less than fully rational without pushing them to the 
irrational end of the spectrum. Furthermore, autonomy as effective deliberation 
may be constrained in ways that do not affect the “rationality” of the decision. 
Lies, deception, and a lack of appropriate information can all limit the effective 
exercise of the abilities required for rational deliberation(25). 
In sum, the foregoing theoretical analysis reveals that criminal liability can 
primarily be imposed on autonomous individuals when they possess the abilities 
necessary for effective deliberation free of internal restrictions (autonomy as 
effective deliberation), and when their actions are neither coerced by others 
(autonomy as liberty of action) nor their options are narrowed by material 
constraints (autonomy as freedom of choice). The following discussion 
highlights how the adoption of such individualistic approach is problematic in 
relation to corporate criminal liability.    
                                      
(25)    Mappes and DeGrazia, 1996 supra at p 27. 
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2.2. Grounds of Corporate Criminal Liability 
The criminal responsibility of corporation was virtually unknown to 
criminal law until the second half of the nineteenth century(26). This is because, 
traditionally, criminal law is somehow centred upon the notion that individuals 
are the bearers of rights and duties, and consequently their wrongdoings are the 
direct object of criminal liability. Many of the problems surrounding the 
attribution of criminal liability to corporations revolve around the question of 
whether it is possible to regard corporations as capable of possessing mental 
states as individuals and consequently being found guilty of the commission of 
an offence. It was noted above that the traditional response to the problems of 
accountability is individualism, the basic credo of which is that corporations do 
not commit offences but people do(27). In the same vein, it has been stated that 
"the immediate response to the question as to who can be convicted of a crime is 
to envisage a human being"(28).  It is the concept of individuals which is known 
as the primary target of criminal laws. Quaid has explained the reason behind 
such approach in the following terms: 
One of the reasons why contemporary legal systems have difficulty with 
any concepts other than that of the individuals [as the objects of criminal 
liability] is the heritage of political liberalism. The dominance of liberalism 
which has celebrated the ultimate value of the individual person and 
correspondingly denounced collectivism or social welfarism has inevitably 
been reflected in legal accounts of responsibility. Corporate accountability 
can be seen as an example of a shift toward a mid-way theory of 
communitarianism, which undermines the liberal theory of self, but equally 
wary of social welfarism…individualism is unable to account for the 
corporateness of corporate action and corporate responsibility(29). 
Under the present state of law in both Jordan and Australia, corporations are 
recognised as separate "legal persons(30) " or entities from their shareholders and 
management and so regarded as "legal persons" for some purposes such as 
                                      
(26)  Bronitt S & McSherry B, Principles of Criminal Law, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2001at 
p154. 
(27) Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p473. 
(28)  Bronitt and McSherry, 2001 supra at p154. 
(29)  Quaid, 1998 supra at p 71. 
(30)  See Articles (50 and 51) of the Jordanian Civil Code 1976 No 43. For Australia, see section (22) of 
Acts interpretation Act 1901 (Cth); sections (8/d and 21/1) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). 
Generally, see for example Ashworth, 1999 supra at 116-117; Wells C, Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001 at 75-81. 
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property ownership.  But this has created theoretical and practical problems. On 
the theoretical level, there is the obvious point that merely calling or labelling a 
corporation as a person for legal purposes does not really make it into a person. 
A corporation does not have conscious awareness in the sense just considered 
above. This is because it has no mental states, nor can it have the capacity to step 
back from those states and make rationale and moral decisions about its future 
actions. This absence of consciousness and free will seems to undermine the 
rationale of corporate punishment as retribution and deterrence. As has been 
frequently said, corporations "have no soul to damn and no body to kick"(31). 
Moreover, companies cannot be imprisoned but they can only be fined. But small 
fines tend to be treated as relatively minor costs of doing business and can be 
passed to insurers or customers. In addition, corporations cannot be executed in 
the sense of revoking their charters or canceling their registration [although this 
is theoretically possible under the JPC as will be seen below] or fining them into 
bankruptcy or compulsorily nationalizing them. But, in the former case at least, 
workers, and other shareholders who are obviously not guilty of the crime in 
question are highly likely to be major victims of such operations. It is therefore 
likely that the courts will be unwilling to do any of these things. [Corporate 
punishment is considered further below]. 
On the practical level, there are major evidentiary problems for investigators 
and prosecutors in establishing not only who specifically has engaged in the 
forbidden action, but also whether the person [or group of persons] had the 
required mental state for the commission of the crime in question.  Another 
dangerous, but possible, risk which might emerge here is what we might refer to 
as the "sacrificed personnel". As Fisse points out "to impose individual liability 
alone would be to allow corporations to externalize the criminal costs of their 
enterprise by getting expendable personnel to take the rap"(32). He continues to 
say that the continuing relevance of the risk created by personnel expendability is 
evident from the tactic adopted by some companies of setting up the internal 
accountability in such a way so as to have the vice-president who goes to jail(33). 
The adoption of such mechanism which offers a splendid sacrifice will make the 
prosecutors feel sufficiently satisfied and refrain from pressing charges against 
the corporation. 
                                      
(31) Dirkis M & Nicoll G, Corporate and White-Collar Crime, In Hazlehurst K M, (eds) Crime and 
Justice, LBC Information Service, Sydney, 1996 at p261. 
(32)  Fisse B, The Duality of Corporate and Individual Criminal Liability, In Hochstedler E, (eds) 
Corporations As Criminals, Sage Publications, London, 1984 at p 73. 
(33)  Fisse, 1984 supra at 74. 
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There is a growing social awareness that corporate wrongdoings are more 
widespread, dangerous and more likely to cause harm to society than those of 
individual behavior(34).  Indeed, as it has been asked by Quad what is more 
serious: pollution of a river as part of industrial activities or stealing a loaf of 
bread by an individual to feed his or her starving children(35).  But as he says, 
although the answer is quiet clear, corporate activities are often viewed 
differently from human activities. As Wells notes: 
The contrast between the social and legal constructions of crime prevents us 
from seeing corporations as real criminal and highlights a paradox. Theft is 
the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another…much of what 
corporations do legitimately is the lawful pursuit of that which done 
dishonestly would be regarded as anti-social. Corporate goals are directed 
toward making profits at another's expense…the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable appropriation, then, may be a fine one. The process whereby 
class and wealth determine the enthusiasm with which undesirable activities 
are repressed is what Foucault dubbed "the restructuring of the economy of 
illegalities"(36).  
It is commonly acknowledged by legal commentators that companies may 
commit most offences such as conspiracy, black marketing offences, being an 
accessory to an offence of causing death or dangerous driving, incitement, 
attempt to commit a given offence and many other offences(37). It is undeniable 
that corporations operate as providers of services in a wide range of areas such as 
transportation, food production, and they are involved in major activities relating 
to the environment, consumer protection and occupational health and safety 
which pose serious potential dangers to the public(38). Corporate criminality is 
not limited to economical cost associated with corporate crime such as tax 
violation, rather it has physical and social cost as well. For example, in Australia, 
there are a significant number of work related deaths occurring every year 
because of corporate criminal behaviors.  
In a study of occupational health and safety offences, Santina Perrone 
found that between January 1987 and December 1990, 353 work related 
                                      
(34)  Norrie, 2001 supra at p82. 
(35)  Quaid, 1998 supra at p109. 
(36)  Wells, 2001 supra at p 10. 
(37) Gillies P, Criminal Law, 4th ed, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1997 at p132; McSherry and 
Bronitt, 2001 supra at p155. 
(38)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p169 
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deaths had occurred in Victoria alone… of those deaths, 203 occurred in a 
corporate context and 25 of those were related to an "extreme level of 
company negligence" sufficient to establish criminal culpability to sustain a 
conviction of manslaughter(39).  
Similarly, Kramer states that, in America for example: 
Over 100,000 deaths a year are attributed to occupational related diseases, 
the majority of which are caused by the knowing and willful violation of 
occupational health and safety laws by corporations…additionally, 14,200 
workers are killed in industrial accidents, with two million more receiving 
disabling injuries. The majority of these deaths and injuries can be 
attributed to dangerous work conditions maintained by corporations in 
violation of federal law(40). 
Workers are not the only victims of corporate crime as Kramer argues but 
the general public is often victimized simply by living in an environment made 
unsafe by corporate actions. But as Ashworth points out, this growing 
recognition of the significance of corporate harm-doing has not been 
accompanied by substantial alteration of the framework of criminal liability(41). 
The trend has been to attempt to fit corporate liability within the existing 
structure instead of considering its implication afresh.  But the foregoing 
discussion reveals that the notion of individual autonomy does not provide a 
proper basis of corporate criminal liability. The idea of a person being liable for 
a crime caused by his or her action or inaction is understandable. By contrast, the 
concept of a corporation, which is a "legal fiction", committing a crime is more 
difficult as a corporation is an entity with no "soul or body, does not think, speak 
or act".   So, our conception regards only individuals as being real in the social 
world while corporations are abstractions which cannot be observed.  Yet, as has 
been argued: 
The notion that individuals are real, observable, flesh and blood, while 
corporations are legal fictions, is false. Plainly, many features of corporations 
are observable (their assets, factories, decisionmaking procedures), while 
many features of individuals are not (.e.g personality, intention, unconscious 
mind). Both individuals and corporations are defined by a mix of observable 
                                      
(39) Cited in  McSherry and Bronitt, 2001 supra at p154. 
(40) Kramer R C, Corporate Criminality: The Development of an Idea, In Hochstedler E, (eds) 
Corporations As Criminals, Sage Publications, London, 1984 at p19-20.  
 
(41)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p117. 
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and abstracted characteristics(42). 
Although there is no settled theory of corporate personality, corporate 
criminal liability has been dominated by a "nominalist" theory which postulates 
that corporations do not commit crimes but individuals do(43).  According to this 
view, corporations are simply a collection of individuals and corporate criminal 
liability involves the attribution of the fault of specific individuals to the 
corporate entity as corporations are incapable of being at fault on their own. In 
contrast, the "realist" theory of corporate personality conceives corporations as 
having an independent existence and capable of being at fault in their own 
right(44).  From this perspective, corporations are not simply regarded as vehicles 
for individuals to commit crimes, but as criminal actors in themselves.  The 
attribution of criminal liability to corporations according to this view entails 
basing such liability on the ground of an "organizational" rather than "individual" 
fault.  
It might be questionable whether corporations should be equated with 
individuals and treated on the same footing for the purpose of imposing criminal 
liability. It is, however, unquestionable that corporations should be held 
accountable for their wrongdoings. But the challenge to any theory of corporate 
criminal liability lies in the ability to go beyond the confines of the human 
person and identify other attributes which enable an entity to be capable of being 
criminally a responsible actor(45). So, the question becomes how to impose 
criminal liability upon corporations?  There are two possible ways through which 
a corporation can be held criminally accountable for the commission of an 
offence: "vicarious" liability and "direct" liability. In what follows, these 
possible grounds of corporate criminal liability are considered with a view to 
suggesting that corporate direct criminal liability as a more effective approach to 
such liability. 
2.2.1. The Traditional Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Vicarious Liability 
As discussed above, criminal laws in both Jordan and Australia focus on the 
notions of mens rea and actus reus as the components of a criminal offence. 
Accordingly, a corporation as an artificial entity cannot act nor can it possess a 
                                      
(42)  Fisse  and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p476. 
(43) Clough J & Mulhern C, The Prosecution of Corporations, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002 
at p64. 
(44)  Clough and Mulhern, 2002 supra at 64-65. 
(45)  Quad, 1998 supra at p 71. 
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guilty mind except through its officers and agents. If corporations are to be made 
criminally liable, then the law has to create a way through which criminal 
liability can be attributed to them.  In response to this need, the criminal laws in 
both Jordan and Australia have introduced and recognized the notion of vicarious 
liability. Borrowing from civil law principles, it is now well established that a 
corporation can be held vicariously liable for the act of its employees provided 
that they have acted within the scope of their employment. Under this doctrine of 
vicarious liability, corporations are made criminally liable as a principal offender 
not because of their own "direct actions" but because of the "action of another 
person"(46). It has been stated that there is no doubt that in Australia the vicar's 
criminal actions may be attributed to the employer in reliance upon the doctrine 
of vicarious liability(47). The bulk of the Common law cases in Australia and 
Article (74) of the JPC tend to assert this type of corporate accountability on the 
basis of this doctrine(48).   
But for this type of vicarious liability to be imposed various requirements 
need to be established. First, this liability can only be attached to the corporation 
when the relevant law intends to impose vicarious liability.  It appears that the 
criminal laws in both Jordan and Australia contain legal provisions to this effect. 
In Jordan, Article 74/2 of the JPC states that: 
 Excluding the governmental departments and the public official 
organizations, criminal liability can be attributed to the 'non-natural persons' for 
the crimes which are committed by their managers or representatives when they 
commit such an offence using the name of the organization or with the intention 
of benefiting it(49).  
In Australia, Division (12) of the CCA states that:  
12.1. (1) This Code applies to bodies corporate in the same way as it applies 
to individuals. It so applies with such modifications as set out in this 
Part, and with such other modifications as are made necessary by the 
                                      
(46)  Gillies, 1997 supra at p130,134;  McSherry and Bronitt, 2001 supra at p156; Alsied, 2002 supra at 
p531-534; Almajalee N T, Explanation of the General Principles in the Penal Code of Jordan, D r 
Althakafah for Publication, Jordan, 2005 at p392. 
(47)  Gillies, 1997 suprat at p135. 
(48)  See for example, Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority v Overseas and General Stevedoring Co 
Pty Ltd  (1959) 1 FLR 298; Banger v Drift Fruit Juices Pty Ltd  [1974 VR 677; Schenker and Co 
(Aust) Pty Ltd v Sheen  (1983)48 ALR 693; Woolworths Ltd v Luff  (1988) 77 ACTR  1.  
(49)  Article (442) of the JPC also provides that" upon the commission of an offence for the benefit of a 
corporation, the corporation shall be held responsible for that crime with the individuals who have 
committed that offence or participated in its commission being held liability". 
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fact that criminal liability is being imposed on bodies corporate rather 
than individuals. 
(2) A body corporate may be found guilty of any offence, including one 
punishable by imprisonment(50). 
12.2. If a physical element of an offence is committed by an employee, 
agent, or officer or body corporate acting within the actual or apparent 
scope of his or her employment, or within his or her actual or apparent 
authority, the physical element must also be attributed to the body 
corporate. 
Secondly, the employee, officer or agent must have committed the offence 
in question in the course of his or her employment or authority.  This 
requirement is evident from the wording of the above-mentioned legal provisions 
in both Jordan and Australia. But unlike Australian law, vicarious liability under 
Jordanian law can only be attached to a corporation when an employee acts or 
omit to act with the intention of benefiting the corporation pursuant to Article 
(74/2) of the JPC. Whereas, acting with this intention is not a condition for 
corporate vicarious liability in Australia(51), though it is necessary that the act 
committed falls within the employee's scope of employment or authority. 
Thirdly, the employee needs to have the relevant state of mind required in 
the definition of the offence committed under both the Australian(52) and 
Jordanian criminal laws. In Australia, unless the offence is one of strict or 
absolute liability, it needs to be proved that the employee possessed the relevant 
mental state concerning the crime in question. Section 12.3 (1) of the CCA states 
that: 
If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to the 
physical element of an offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body 
corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorized or permitted the 
commission of the offence. 
Similarly, although the wording of Article (74/2) of the JPC does not 
explicitly state that, this requirement is implied in that Article and can be inferred 
from other Articles of the JPC.  A close look at the JPC, particularly Articles 
                                      
(50)  Section 4B of the Crimes Act 1914 enables a fine to be imposed for offences that only specify 
imprisonment as a penalty.  
(51) Austrakian Stevedoring Industry Authority v Overseas and General Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd  (1959)
1 FLR 298. 
(52)  Moussell Bros Ltd v London and Northwestern Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836. 
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(63-67) which lay down the principles regarding mens rea, reveals that proving 
the mens rea is required before criminal liability can be attributed to the offender 
for the commission of any offence. As has been argued there is no evidence in 
the JPC to indicate that criminal liability can be imposed without a proof of a 
certain form of mens rea(53).  Noticeably, the attribution of criminal liability to a 
certain corporation for the commission of an offence by one of its employees 
does not excuse that employee of being personally held liable for his or her 
crime(54). In other words, in principle, the liability of the corporation is not a 
substitute for the individual liability and visa versa.  
As discussed above, a corporation, like a human individual, can be made 
vicariously liable for a crime committed by its employee. The status of the 
employee acting within the scope of employment is irrelevant for the purpose of 
the doctrine of vicarious liability. Thus, the most junior employee can act in such 
a way so as to incriminate his or her employer. Liability may arise 
notwithstanding that the offence is or may be committed without reference to a 
senior person within the company, who is so closely associated with its affair 
management.  Moreover, the assumption underlying vicarious liability is that 
corporations are held liable for the criminal acts of their vicars because the 
former have failed to take the necessary steps to make sure that no crime is 
committed.  Deeper consideration of the issue, however, entails examining 
situations involving corporations as being the primary cause for the crime 
committed by either intentionally causing their employees to commit crimes or 
through providing an encouraging environment for criminal behaviors. In this 
sense, it is necessary to look beyond the notion of "vicarious" liability by 
exploring other possible grounds for corporate "direct" criminal liability. The 
bases which allow the attribution of direct criminal liability to corporations are 
dealt with below. 
                                      
(53)  Alseid, 2002 supra at p341-343. 
(54)  Alseid, 2002 supra at p534;  Gillies, 1997 supra at p147-149; Saleh N A, Crimes against the 
Economy in the Jordanian Law, Dar Alfeker for Publication, Amman, 1990 at p152. 
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2.2.2 Direct Criminal Liability for Corporations(55) 
The purpose of this section is to explore the possible basis of corporate 
"direct" rather than "vicarious" liability. Three possible grounds have been 
proposed to allow the attribution of direct criminal liability to corporations 
including the "identification" doctrine, the "aggregation of fault" doctrine and the 
"organizational" doctrine. These doctrines are considered below consecutively. 
2.2.2.1. The Identification Doctrine 
As noted above, the gist of the problem associated with the attribution of 
"direct" criminal liability to corporations revolves around the question of 
whether or not corporations can possess mens rea in relation to a criminal 
conduct. The answer to this question lies in what is known as the identification 
doctrine which seeks to assimilate corporate mens rea to individual mens rea. 
Liability under this doctrine hinges upon the allocation of an individual (or 
individuals) within the corporation who is so closely associated with its affair or 
management so as to regard his or her act or state of mind as being those of the 
company for legal purposes. In this sense, he or she is not viewed as being mere 
"vicar" of the corporation, and as such the corporation's liability is not merely 
vicarious. This doctrine operates to allow the attribution of "direct" criminal 
liability to corporations for the acts of certain persons who, when acting in the 
company's business, are viewed to be the "embodiment of the corporation" and 
whose acts are thus deemed to be the corporation's act(56).  
In other words, corporate criminal liability under this doctrine hinges upon 
the allocation of the "mind of the company in selected employees". This doctrine 
seeks to identify the individuals who control or who are said to represent the 
mind and will of the corporation such as directors, managers or other superior 
officers and regard their state of mind as the state of mind of the corporation for 
the purpose of criminal liability(57). Accordingly, where those individuals at the 
top of the corporation, act on its behalf with a guilty mind, then their state of 
                                      
(55)   For a more general discussion on this issue see, Norrie, 2001 supra at p92-105; Fisse and 
Braithwaite, 1988 supra at 469-513;  Fisse B, ‘Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Law and 
Corporate Liability to Monetary Penalties’ (1990) 13 (1) UNSW LJ 1 at 1-41; Fisse B & Braithwaite 
J, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993; Field S & 
Jorg N,  ‘Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should we be Going Dutch?’ [1991] Crim LR 156 at 
156-171; Ashworth, 1999 supra at 116-124. 
(56) Murugason R & McNamara L, Outline of Criminal Law, Butterworths, Sydney, 1997 at p40. 
(57)  See for example P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R 72 at 81-2; Collins v 
State Rail Authority (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 209; Brambles Holdngs Ltd v Carey (1976) 15 SASR 
270; R v Roffel [1985] VR 5 11(FC). 
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mind will be directly transferred to the corporation(58). In Jordan, a version of this 
doctrine exists under Article 74/2 of the JPC which provides that a corporation 
can be held liable for the act or acts of its "managers" when the crime is 
committed by using one of its means or with the intention to benefit that 
corporation. At Common law, the origins of this doctrine is found and clearly 
explained in the following quote from Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v 
Nattrass [1972] AC 153 at170-171(59): 
A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be 
negligent and he [or she] has hands to carry out his [or her] intention.  A 
corporation has none of these: it must act through living persons, though not 
always one or the same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking or 
acting for the company. He [or she] is acting as the company and his [or her] 
mind which directs his [or her] acts is the mind of the company.  There is no 
question of the company being vicariously liable. He [or she] is not acting as 
a servant, representative, agent, or delegate. He [or she] is an embodiment of 
the company, or, one could say, he [or she] hears and speaks through the 
persona of the company, within his [or her] appropriate sphere, and his [or 
her] mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is 
the guilt of the company. It must be a question of law whether, once the facts 
have been ascertained, a person in doing particular things is to be regarded as 
the company or merely as the company’s servant or agents. In that case any 
liability of the company can only be a statutory or vicarious liability … 
normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other 
superior officers of a company carry out the functions of management and 
speak and act as the company. Their subordinates do not…the board of 
directors may delegate some part of their functions of management giving to 
their delegate full discretion to act independently of instructions from them… 
within the scope of the delegation [the delegate] can act as the company.  
2.2.2.1.1. Problems with the Doctrine of Identification 
The doctrine of identification attracts some major criticisms(60).With its 
current formulation, it stands as a legal barrier for effective corporate direct 
                                      
(58)  Norrie, 2001 supra at 93. 
(59)  See also, for example, Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121 at 127; Collins v State Rail 
Authority (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 209; Brambles Holdings Ltd v Carey (1976) 15 SASR 270; R v 
Roffel [1985] VR 511(FC). In addition, the echo of Tesco principle is witnessed under the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) although the net extends wider to include ‘high managerial agents’ in s 12.3 
(1,2 (a, b). 
(60)  See Fisse, 1990 supra at 3-4; Clough and Mulhern, 2002 supra at p 89-93. 
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criminal liability since it fails to apprehend the collective responsibility of 
corporations. As it has already been pointed out, it is the acts and mental state of 
mind of those who represent the "head" of the corporation or those who have an 
influential position as controlling officers which is relevant to the question of 
corporate direct criminal culpability(61).  Along the lines of vicarious liability, the 
law has tried to superimpose its individualistic constructs onto companies instead 
of trying to look at the problem of corporate wrongdoing with fresh eyes. This 
approach is narrow because those who are not the "head" of the company but 
rather are considered as its "hands’" may be involved in certain criminal actions 
in the course of their employment without any attribution of fault to the 
corporation. The principle in Tesco tends to restrict corporate criminal liability to 
a high level by confining the accountability of corporation to those who are said 
to be the directing mind and will of that corporation such as the board of 
directors, its managing directors to whom the function of the board has been 
fully delegated(62). 
Further, the identification theory fails to acknowledge the diffusion of 
responsibility in the corporation where a number of persons at the top of an 
organisation might be severally liable for acts of contributory negligence or 
recklessness(63). Moreover, even if it might be possible to identify the individuals 
who are regarded as the mind of the corporation, it would be difficult to prove 
their "mental" involvement in the commission of an offence due to complex 
corporate structure and delegation of authority.  Furthermore, as has been 
asserted, the Tesco principle is unworkable in the context of large 
corporations(64). This is because offences committed on behalf of an organisation 
are often committed at a middle or lower level of management whereas the Tesco 
principle requires fault on the part of a high level management. Fisse continues 
to point out that it is a fallacy that corporate criminal liability should be defined 
by reference to the state of mind of those located at the top of the company. 
Corporate decision making is not confined to the highest level of the corporation 
but it is diffused throughout the organization.  In the corporate world, many 
employees have input in managing the company and the persons at the top are 
                                      
(61)  Parson S, "The Doctrine of Identification, Causation and Corporate Liability for Manslaughter" 
(2003) 67(1) The Journal of Criminal Law 69 at p69-71. 
(62)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p119-120 ; Norrie, 2001 supra at p93-94;  McSherry and Bronitt, 
2001suprat at p157.  
(63)  Norrie, 2001 supra at p94. 
(64) Fisse ,1990 supra at p3. 
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often remote from the day-to-day sources of operational power. In a similar vein, 
it has been stated that: 
[O]ne effect of [the] identification doctrine is that the more diffuse the 
company structure, the more it devolves power to semi-autonomous mangers, 
the easier it will be to avoid liability. This is of particular importance given 
the increasing tendency of many organisations specifically to decentralize 
safety services.  It is clearly in the interest of shrewd and unscrupulous 
management to do so… secondly, the limits of criminal liability constructed 
by the identification doctrine do not reflect properly the limits of the moral 
responsibility of the corporation itself. This cannot be limited to 
responsibility for the acts of high ranking officials such as company 
directors. Priorities in hierarchical organisations like corporations are set 
predominately from above. It is these priorities that determine the social 
context within which a corporation’s shop-floor workers and the like make 
decisions about working practices. A climate of safety or unsafety may 
permeate the entire organisation but be created at the highest level. Thus, if 
criminal law is to reflect this moral responsibility, in appropriate cases legal 
responsibility ought to extend to acts done by the ‘hands’ of the 
corporation(65). 
In line with the above criticism, Fisse and Braithwaite strongly criticized the 
identification doctrine stating that it is highly unsatisfactory mainly because it 
fails to reflect corporate blameworthiness(66). To prove fault on the part of one 
managerial representative of a company is not to show that the company was at 
fault. The authors continue to, rightfully, argue that the Tesco principle does not 
reflect personal fault but amounts to vicarious liability for the fault of a restricted 
range of representatives exercising corporate functions. This compromised form 
of vicarious liability is doubly unsatisfactory because the compromise is struck 
in a way that makes it difficult to establish corporate criminal liability against 
large companies. According to them, offences committed on behalf of 
corporations are often visible at the level of middle management whereas the 
Tesco principle requires proof of a top-level manager. Furthermore, it has been 
warned that well-advised corporations can take steps to make sure that they do 
not fall within the identification principle because some judgments suggest that 
the principle is not applicable to situations involving managers exercising 
                                      
(65) Field and Jorg,1991 supra at p158-159.  
(66)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993 supra at p47. 
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substantial functions when the boards of directors have retained a formal right of 
vote or intervention(67). 
It appears that the authors' main concern, as stated above, is evident in the 
Common Law case R v AC Hatrick Chemical Pty Ltd (Unreported, 29/11/1995 
SC VIC). In that case, the corporation [the plant engineer and the plant manager] 
were charged with manslaughter in relation to a tank which had exploded during 
a welding operation causing the death of a worker and serious injury to another. 
The charges against the individuals were withdrawn and the Judge directed a 
verdict of acquittal against the corporation. The acquittal rested, in part, on the 
fact that the plant engineer and the plant manager were not "the guiding mind" of 
the company.  
But again, assuming that it is possible for a corporation as a whole to be 
blameworthy, it is arguable that a fault on the part of any individual 
representative does necessarily mean that the corporation was at fault. And even 
if this is possible to attain, in large corporations with complex management 
structures, it will be virtually impossible to identify an individual who has 
committed the requisite element of the crime. Blameworthiness often appears to 
be widely distributed amongst many different individuals and levels of the 
hierarchy. But the problem of the Tesco principle is that without any "particular 
individual" or "level" being sufficiently blameworthy no corporate criminal 
liability can follow. Another possible basis of corporate liability which has been 
offered to address these concerns is discussed below. 
2.2.2.2. The Aggregation of Fault Doctrine 
Various solutions have been proposed to accommodate corporate 
responsibility including the notion that the law should adopt an "aggregation of 
fault" doctrine. This doctrine seeks to overcome the limitations of the 
identification doctrine, particularly, the dichotomy between the acts of the high-
ranking officials in a company and the company’s "hands". As has been asserted, 
this dichotomy fails to acknowledge the indissoluble connections between 
individuals in collective enterprises like corporations(68). The diffusion of 
responsibilities or decision-making process in the real world of corporations 
militates against corporate culpability when the harm is being caused by the 
corporate "hands" or persons who are not seen as its "controlling mind". The 
basic idea of the aggregation of fault doctrine is that corporate culpability should 
be constructed around the knowledge and attitudes of the employees as a whole 
                                      
(67)  Fisse, 1990 supra at p4.   
(68)  Field and Jorg, 1991 supra at p160. 
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instead of being contingent on the knowledge of one or few employees(69). In 
other words, the accumulative actions of various persons within a corporation 
could be aggregated so that in their totality they might amount to the requisite 
degree of corporate blameworthiness. Aggregation in this sense involves a 
recognition that individuals within the corporation contribute to the whole 
mechanism, and hence it is the whole which is judged not the parts.  
At Common Law in Australia, it has been proposed that the guilty mind of a 
corporation can be collected from the mental states of several employees. To this 
effect, in Brambles Holdings Ltd v Carey (1976) 15 SASR 270 at pp 275-276, 
Chief Justice Bray made the following remarks: 
In my view, it is a fallacy to say that any state of mind to be attributed to a 
corporation must always be the state of mind of one particular officer alone 
and that the corporation can never know or believe more than one man 
knows or believes. This cannot be so when it is a case of successive holders 
of the office in question or of the holder of the office and his deputy or 
substitute during his absence. Let us suppose that a piece of information, X, 
is conveyed to one officer of the company, A, then A goes on holidays and B 
takes his place and a further piece of information, Y, is communicated to 
him. It is a fallacy to say that the company does not know both X and Y 
because A only Knows X and B only knows Y.  As a matter of fact, it may 
well be B's duty when he is told about Y to find out about X. I hasten to add 
that although I think a corporation has in a proper case the combined 
knowledge or belief possessed by more than one of its officers, that does not 
mean that it can know or believe two contradictory things at once. 
The aggregation of fault as a basis of corporate culpability was also 
considered in the English case R v HM Coroner for East Kent, Ex Parte Spooner 
and Others (1989) 88 Cr App R 11-17. In that case, the legal issue arose after a 
ferry ship capsized after leaving Zeebrugge harbor with its doors open resulting 
in the loss of nearly 200 lives. Sheen Judge conducted an investigation about the 
cause of the incident finding that the immediate cause behind it was the sailing of 
the ferry while its doors were open. Sheen Judge criticized several individuals of 
the ship’s crew who had failed to perform their duties. In particular, he criticized 
those responsible for failing to close the doors, those failing to see that the doors 
were not closed and those sailing without knowing that the doors were not 
closed.  The relatives of victims relied on Sheen Judge's report and argued that it 
was not necessary to identify a person who is individually responsible for that 
                                      
(69)  Wells, 2001 supra at p156. 
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capsize to hold the company liable. Rather, the corporate culpability could be 
established by reference to a number of aggregate individual faults. But Bingham 
LJ rejected this argument ruling that: 
I do not think that the aggregation argument assists the applicants. Whether 
the defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant…a case against a 
personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant. 
The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly 
addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such (16-17). 
Bingham J advanced no convincing reason for rejecting the idea that 
evidence of a corporation’s culpability could be established by the aggregation of 
a number of individual instances of negligence. Arguably, it can be said that the 
criminal responsibility of a corporation might be addressed by allowing the 
aggregation of faults of several individuals within a certain corporation to be 
imputed to that corporation.  
While the aggregation of fault approach has been rejected in England(70)  
has no explicit basis under the JPC, it is recognized in Australia under the CCA. 
Section 12.4 (2) provides that: 
(a)  If negligence is the fault element of an offence; and  
(b)  No individual employee, agents or officer of the body corporate has 
that fault element; that fault element may exist on the part of the body 
corporate if the body corporate’s conduct is negligent when viewed as a 
whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of any number of its 
employees, agents or officers. 
2.2.2.2.1. Problems with the Aggregation of Fault Doctrine 
Although the doctrine of aggregation is considered an advanced step toward 
effective corporate liability when compared with the identification doctrine, it 
has nonetheless been the object of various criticisms. First of all, realistically 
corporations are not individuals nor can they be reduced to mere aggregations of 
their constituent human agents so as to render the doctrine of aggregation 
workable. They are "systems" with distinct properties and complex entities with 
their own standards of behavior(71).  Furthermore, although the notion of 
aggregation of fault acknowledges that the harm caused by a corporation might 
                                      
(70)  R v HM Coroner for East Kent, Ex Parte Spooner and Others (1989) 88 Cr App R at16-17 (per 
Bingham LJ). 
(71)  Clough and Mulhern, 2002 supra at p4. 
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involve combined activities of various persons, it fails to provide insight into 
what unifies those activities so as to justify the attribution of culpability to the 
corporation(72).  
Clearly, the doctrine fragments the concept of "directing mind" to reflect the 
way in which the harm occurs. But without the allocation of individual fault 
resulting from a failure to carry out certain responsibilities, the doctrine will be 
rendered futile. According to Norrie the idea of "directing mind" works precisely 
because it analogizes corporate with individual human activities(73). But if this 
analogy is rejected, then it is not clear what unifies aggregated actions to make 
them the actions of the corporation. The doctrine has also been criticized by 
others arguing that  if responsibilities, within a corporation, are not vested in any 
particular group of individuals, it becomes difficult to identify any directing 
mind to suggest that his or her failure represents a culpable fault which if 
combined with faults of another person may form a ground for corporate 
liability (74). Unless this requirement is satisfied the doctrine fails to explain why 
corporate culpability should be based thereon.  
Moreover, even if one can accept that the aggregation of individual faults of 
those working within a corporation is imputable to that corporation, it would be 
extremely hard for the prosecution to prove all these faults beyond all reasonable 
doubt. To illustrate this point, I consider the example provided by Clough and 
Mulhern. Let us say that a child died as a result of drinking water from a 
contaminated stream the cause of which was a toxin discharged into the stream 
by a chemical company. Assume that the scientists knew the toxin was lethal but 
did not know that it was released into the stream. The production managers knew 
it was released into the stream but did not know the water was drunk by a local 
child. The plant manager knew it was drunk by the child but did not know it was 
toxin. Practically, in this example the aggregation of corporate knowledge is 
likely to be extremely complex with a high probability of leaving considerable 
scope of reasonable doubt in favor of the accused corporation(75).  
The problems confronting the law in this area is generated by a failure to 
develop criteria for judging the collective processes rather than trying to 
establish corporate liability by resorting to the individualist approach. The 
identification doctrine serves the necessary connection between individuals 
                                      
(72)  Norrie, 2001 supra at p95.  
(73)  Norrie, 2001 supra at p95 
(74)  Field and Jorg, 1991 supra at p162. 
(75)  Clough and Mulhern, 2002 supra at p107. 
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within the corporation, and the rejection of aggregation lead to an inappropriate 
individualistic approach for corporate blameworthiness. As pointed out by 
Clough and Mulhern, aggregation is "a clumsy attempt to reflect organisational 
blameworthiness within a model that is inherently unsuited for the purpose"(76).   
Therefore, it is thought necessary to go beyond both the individualism of the 
identification doctrine and the diffusion of that individualism in the aggregation 
approach seeking to place corporate direct criminal liability in what might be 
termed as the "organizational doctrine". In this sense, corporate culpability 
should be structured around accepting the idea that corporations are capable of 
being blameworthy in "their own right even in the absence of individual fault". 
Arguably, this model can better serve as a ground of such liability if combined 
with a notion of strict liability. These points are discussed below. 
2.2.2.3. The Organizational Doctrine 
The individualistic approach in its "aggregate or non-aggregate" form 
requires an identifiable human actor or actors in order to attribute fault to the 
corporation. Such an approach cannot accommodate situations involving 
corporate harmful behaviors resulting from a system failure or a cumulation of 
various faults by many agents neither of which are sufficient to sustain an 
individual attribution of fault. Vicarious liability is also limited because it holds 
the corporation liable for the acts of its agent regardless of any corporate fault. It 
is therefore, necessary to look for another alternative approach for such liability 
that seeks to move beyond the individualism of the identification doctrine and 
the diffusion of that individualism in the "aggregation of fault" doctrine. It rather 
envisages to ground the culpability of corporations in the creation of an 
organisational environment that may be unsafe, inefficient and consequently 
criminally dangerous(77). It intends to use the corporation’s policies, or their 
absence as a basis for corporate culpability(78).  
A model of corporate criminal liability which attempts to go beyond 
individually-based and vicarious liability and proposes a means of integrating the 
concept of "organizational blameworthiness" has been developed by Fisse and 
Braithwaite in their work "The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability" (1988) 11 Syd LR 468 at pp 
                                      
(76)  Clough and Mulhern, 2002 supra at p108. 
(77)  Norrie, 2001supra at p96. 
(78)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p122. 
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473-513(79). The authors assert that corporations are blameworthy but such 
blameworthiness has been reduced by law to blameworthiness on the part of 
individual representatives.  However, as they (at p478) point out, although 
institutions are constituted by individuals, and individuals are socially 
constituted by institutions, it is unacceptable to conceive corporations as no more 
than sums of the isolated efforts of individuals. The authors (at p479) argue that 
organizations are not just aggregations of individuals; rather they are systems 
(“socio-technical” systems, as they have sometimes been described). In the case 
of organizations, individuals may be the most important parts, but there are other 
parts which is evident from factories with manifest routines operating to some 
extent independently of the biological agents who flick the switches. According 
to them the reduction of a corporation to its constituent individuals is 
unacceptable because: 
Corporations are blamed in their capacity as organizations for causing harm 
or taking risks in circumstances where they could have acted otherwise. We 
often react to corporate offenders not merely as impersonal harm-producing 
forces but as responsible, blameworthy entities. When people blame 
corporation, they are not merely channeling aggregation against the ox that 
gored or symbolic object. Nor are they pointing the fingers at individuals 
behind the corporate mantle. They are condemning the fact that the 
organization either implement a policy of non-compliance or failed to 
exercise its collective capacity to avoid the offence for which blame 
attaches (pp 481-482). 
It is often said that corporate blameworthiness is a phantom as corporations 
cannot possess a guilty state of mind. As has been asserted by Quaid, one should 
be aware of the distinction between the terms "corporate intentionality" and 
"corporate intention" which can be confused when corporate actions are 
discussed(80).  According to her, the first can be described as the source of the 
capacity of a corporation to be accountable. That is, the corporation is able to act 
in a manner where criminal liability can be attracted to it. The second term 
connotes the mental element which is relevant to a particular offence. Bearing 
this in mind, the author states that a perfect overlap of corporate intentionality 
and action is an interesting feature of the definition of corporate act. That is, 
unlike humans, who may perform involuntary actions through uncontrolled body 
movement, a corporation has no way to act without certain deliberateness. In a 
                                      
(79)  See also, Fisse B and Braithwaite J, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, Cambridge University 
Press, Australia, 1993. 
(80) Quaid, 1998 supra at p90-91.   
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similar vein, it has been argued that while corporations cannot indeed possess 
intentions as "cerebral mental states", nonetheless: 
Corporations exhibit their own special kind of intentionality, namely 
corporate policy…which does not express merely the intentionality of a 
company's directors, officer or employees but projects the idea of a distinctly 
corporate strategy(81). 
Fisse and Braithwaite (at p483-487) assert that the attribution of 
blameworthiness requires two conditions: First, the ability of the actor to make 
decisions. With regard to this condition, the authors point out that Herbert Simon 
has defined a formal organization as a “decision-making structure”. Under this 
definition, a formal organization has one of the requirements for 
blameworthiness and we routinely hold organizations responsible for a decision 
when and because that decision represents an organizational policy and 
represents the outcome of an organizational decision-making process which the 
organization has chosen for itself.  
The second condition of blameworthiness is the inexcusable failure of the 
actor to perform an assigned task.  In relation to this condition, the authors assert 
that any "culture" confers certain types of responsibilities on certain kinds of 
actors. For example, fathers have responsibilities not to neglect their children, 
and doctors bear special responsibilities in the giving of medical advice. By 
analogy, just as fathers and doctors can be held to different and higher standards 
of responsibility by virtue of their role or capacity, so it is possible for 
corporations to be held to different and higher standard of responsibility than 
individuals. It is not a "legal fiction" for the law to hold corporations responsible. 
Corporations should be held responsible for the outcomes of their policies and 
decision-making procedures because they have the capacity to change their 
policies and procedures. As with human individuals, corporations can give moral 
reasons for their decision-making. They are also capable of changing their goals 
and policies and able to change the decision-making processes directed at those 
goals and policies.  
In other words, an organizational blameworthiness can be seen or is 
reflected in the organizational environment that constantly produces certain 
expectations on the part of its employees based on the notion of "corporate 
culture". This "culture" could be found in an attitude, policy, rule, course of 
conduct or practice within the corporate body or in the part of the body corporate 
                                      
(81)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p483. 
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where the offence has occurred(82). Evidence may establish that a corporation's 
unwritten rule or policy tacitly authorizes non-compliance or fails to create a 
culture of compliance.  This notion of "corporate culture" might well contribute 
or cause individuals within the corporation to commit crimes which they would 
not have done otherwise.  As has been  noted a number of psychological studies 
suggest that group decision-making can make members of the group willing to 
accept stupid ideas or hazardous risks that they would reject if making the same 
decision alone(83). A "culture" of this kind might be transmitted from one 
generation of organizational role incumbent to the next, and the entire personnel 
of an organization may change without reshaping the "corporate culture". Thus, 
an advertent fault can be attributed to a corporation where that corporation has 
such a "culture" that promotes the commission of an offence(84).   
Corporate intentionally does not exhaust the range of relevant fault 
concepts(85). In practice, the predominant form of corporate fault is more likely to 
be corporate "negligence" than corporate intention. Corporate negligence is 
prevalent where communication breakdowns occur, or where organizations 
suffer from collective oversight. It may be possible to argue that corporate 
negligence amounts merely to negligence on the part of individuals. Yet, as the 
authors state, it may be possible to explain the "causes" of corporate wrongdoing 
in terms of particular contributions of managers and employees, but the 
"attribution" of fault is another matter.   Corporate negligence is not necessarily 
reduced to individual negligence. This is because a corporation has a greater 
capacity to avoid the commission of an offence than an individual, and it may be 
for this reason that a finding of corporate but not individual negligence may be 
justified.  Thus, where a corporate system is blamed, such blame should not be 
directed at individuals but rather toward an institutional set-up from which the 
standards of organizational performance are expected to be higher than those 
which are expected of any personnel.  
It has been pointed out that while it is possible to define corporate fault in 
terms of corporate policy and corporate negligence, it is also possible that 
corporation will develop a compliance system that look immaculate on paper but 
is not to be taken seriously by the employees(86). Norrie says that the 
organizational doctrine represents an advance step toward effective corporate 
                                      
(82) Wells, 2001 supra at p131.   
(83)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p479. 
(84)  Mann, 2003 supra at p202, 
(85)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p 486. 
(86)  Fisse, 1990 supra at 16. 
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direct criminal liability as it reflects the "socially organized reality of 
corporations"(87). Yet the problem revolves around establishing an 
"organizational fault" as a prerequisite for corporate culpability which requires 
the fulfillment of two conditions. First, it has to be established that a corporate 
entity "accepts" policies and practices despite the fact that they may cause harm. 
And, secondly, the corporation must have "power and capacity" to do something 
about it by changing the general practices and procedures but failed to do so.  
Various solutions are proposed by legal commentators to proving the above-
mentioned conditions. Fisse has suggested three possible ways to establish an 
"organizational fault"(88). First, to recognize that corporations may have an 
implied policy of non-compliance in a given situation. This policy can be 
deemed to exist when the employee who is associated with the offence has 
reason to believe that the corporation expected him or her to act as he or she did 
and that complaining about the matter would be ineffective or would provoke 
retaliatory action against him or her. Secondly, the implied policy of non-
compliance can also be deemed to have existed when the company has no system 
in place whereby employees can report suspected or anticipated episodes of non-
compliance to high level management. Thirdly, Fisse advocates that it is also 
possible to articulate an ethically defensible and workable concept of "corporate 
fault" which reflects its organizational blameworthiness based on the "corporate 
reaction" to the commission of an offence(89). 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the general principle of corporate 
criminal liability requires proof of personal corporate fault on the part of certain 
individual within the corporation. Saying that this principle is unsatisfactory, 
Fisse and Braithwaite suggest to focus more on the "company's reaction" to 
having committed the physical element of an offence.  They point out that 
corporate criminal liability for wrongdoing has traditionally been dependent on 
proof of responsibility for causally relevant action or inactions "at or before" the 
time the wrongful behaviors are committed.  But they argue that it is not 
necessarily that the law should be focused exclusively on this time-frame. 
Similar to situations involving individual offenders, community sentiment of 
"reactive fault" can run deeper than that. For example, in the hit-run driver case, 
it is not so much the hitting but the running after the event which attracts 
condemnation. Corporate blameworthiness can also be judged within a reactive 
time-frame. In this regard, "corporate reactive fault" is defined as "unreasonable 
                                      
(87)  Norrie, 2001 supra at p96-97. 
(88)  Fisse, 1990 supra at p16-17. 
(89)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p504-505. 
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corporate failure to devise and undertake satisfactory preventive or corrective 
measures in response to the commission of the actus reus of an offence by 
personnel acting on behalf of the organization"(90). 
This concept of "reactive fault" offers a way of attributing intentionality to 
corporations insofar as they enact and implement corporate policies. Realizing 
that a ready-made compliance policy might be in place and it is very rare to find 
a company displaying a criminal policy, the authors(91) tate that the focus should 
be shifted from the company's general policies of compliance to what is 
especially proposed to be done to implement a program of internal discipline, 
structural reform or compensation. Adoption of such approach will allow the 
corporate blameworthy intentionality to be flushed out easily if compared to 
looking into the corporate policy "at or before" the time of the commission of the 
offence.  
In a similar vein, some have argued for what they call "organizational 
criteria" as a basis for establishing corporate fault and consequently justifying 
corporate culpability(92). In particular, they argue that a corporation should be 
open to criminal liability where it manifests an "acceptance" of the possibility of 
harmful consequences stemming from actions of its employees and where it had 
the "power" to do something about them by changing its general practices and 
procedures but failed to do so.  With regard to the power to change the 
corporation’s practices and policies, the authors point out that the evaluation 
should take into account "corporate realities".  That is, if the practices of a 
corporation lead to accidents which could have been prevented or avoided by 
readily available safety measures, by changing the general practices and 
procedures of the corporation or by installing new safety devices, that 
corporation may be said to have the power to eliminate the risk. In relation to the 
corporation’s acceptance of its dangerous practices, the authors argue that, rather 
than addressing issues of anticipation of risk, corporate liability should simply 
relate to the adequacy of corporate monitoring of risky or illegal behaviors.  
As Brown, Farrier, Egger and McNamara(93) point out, Fisse and 
Braithwaite's concepts of "organizational blameworthiness" has now been taken 
                                      
(90)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supr at p505. 
(91)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supr at p506. 
(92)  Field and Jorg ,1991 supra at p 163-171. 
(93)  Brown D & Farrier D & Weisbrot D & McNamara L, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary 
on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales, 3rd ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2001 at 
p479. 
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up in Division (12) of Part (2.5) of the CCA. Section (12.3)of that Code provides 
that: 
(1) If intention, knowledge or recklessness is the fault element in relation 
to a physical element of an offence, that fault element must be 
attributed to a body corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorized or permitted the commission of an offence.  
(2) The means by which such an authorization or permission may be 
established include: 
(a) Proving that the body corporate's board of directors intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, 
tacitly or impliedly authorized or permitted the commission of the 
offence; or 
(b) Proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct, 
or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorized or permitted the 
commission of the offence; or 
(c)  Proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that 
directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the 
relevant provision; or 
(d) Proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a 
corporate culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.  
Under the CCA, the notion of ‘corporate culture’ is defined as "an attitude, 
policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate 
generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities 
takes place" (s 12.3 (6). These paragraphs need to be read alongside section 
12.3.4 which articulates that factors relevant to the application of paragraph 2 (c) 
or (d) include: 
(a) whether authority to commit an offence of the same or a similar 
character had been given by a high managerial agent of the body 
corporate; and  
(b) Whether the employee, agent, or officer of the body corporate who 
committed the offence believed on reasonable grounds, or entertained a 
reasonable expectation, that a high managerial agent of the body 
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corporate would have authorized or permitted the commission of the 
offence Section 12.4 (2)(94) provides that: 
(a)  If negligence is the fault element of an offence; and  
(b)  No individual employee, agents or officer of the body corporate has 
that fault element; that fault element may exist on the part of the body 
corporate if the body corporate’s conduct is negligent when viewed as a 
whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of any number of its 
employees, agents or officers. 
Section 12.4(3) provides that: negligence may be evidenced by the fact that 
the prohibited conduct was substantially attributed to: 
(a) Inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct 
of one or more of its employees, agents or officers; or 
(b) Failure to provide adequate system for conveying relevant information 
to relevant persons in the body corporate. 
While the approach adopted in the above provisions may constitute a 
significant step in developing and clarifying standards of corporate criminal 
liability, it gives rise to new questions that may reveal the need for further 
reform. Part three of this paper elucidates some of these issues. 
3. Part two: Serious Consideration of Corporate Accountability 
Three issues are considered in this part including corporate culture and the 
limits of criminal law, combining the organizational doctrine with the notion of 
strict liability, and corporate punishment. 
3.1. Corporate Culture and the Limits of Criminal Law: 
3.1.1. The Limits of Criminal Law: A Black and White Picture 
The notion of "corporate culture" poses some serious issues and problems in 
relation to corporate accountability including a re-consideration of the scope and 
boundaries of the theory of the "moral perpetrator of crime" in Jordan and its 
corresponding, and to a large extent identical, doctrine of innocent agent in 
Australia. In both jurisdictions, this theory is restricted and confined to only 
                                      
(94)  Subsection (1) of section 12.4 provides that "the test of negligence for a corporate body is that set 
out in section 5.5.  Section 5.5 states that: a person is negligent with respect to a physical element of 
an offence if his or her conduct involves: (a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and (b) such a high risk that the physical 
element exists or will exist; that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence. 
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accommodate situations involving the principal's "intentional" exploitation and 
usage of another innocent agent to perform the physical element of a certain 
offence. In this sense, the principal offender could be an individual or a 
corporation. But the theory does not apply to situations involving any state of 
mind less than intention on the part of the principal when he or she "negligently" 
causes another person to commit a given offence. To add to the picture, both 
laws recognize a range of criminal defences which operate as exculpating 
excuses of criminal liability such as duress, necessity, insanity and so forth. But 
they do not go any further considering notions including what might be termed 
as "economical duress" and its relevance to criminal culpability, at least, in 
relation to corporate criminal liability.  
It is submitted here that, any serious consideration of corporate crime and 
responsibility should involve a re-examination of these issues if corporate 
collective blameworthiness is really to be reflected.  Although it is acknowledged 
that it will be an uphill struggle to achieve legal reforms in this direction, it is 
nonetheless necessary to raise this issue and highlight, briefly, its relevance in 
the context of corporate criminal liability.  
In both Jordan and Australia, "duress" involves a very severe restriction of 
the options available to the individuals concerned(95). They are forced to make a 
                                      
(95)  In Australia, Smith J in R v Hurley [1967] VR 526 (which has been approved in subsequent 
decisions) sets out the elements of duress as follows: 
Where the accused has been required to do the act charged against him (i) under a threat that death 
or grievous bodily harm will be inflicted unlawfully upon a human being if the accused fails to do 
the act and (ii) the circumstances were such that a person of ordinary firmness would have been 
likely to yield to the threat in the way the accused did and (iii) the threat was present and continuing, 
imminent and impeding…and (iv) the accused reasonably apprehended that the threat would be 
carried out and (v) he was induced thereby to commit the crime charged and (vi) that the crime was 
not murder, nor any other crime so heinous as to be excepted from the doctrine and (vii) the accused 
did not, by fault on his part when free from the duress, expose himself to its application and (viii) he 
had no means, with safety to himself, of preventing the execution of the threat, then the accused in 
such circumstances at least, has a defence of duress (p543). [See also McCafferty [1974] 1 NSWLR 
89 at 90 per Glass J] 
In Jordan, Article 88 of the JPC deals with duress as follows: 
There shall be no punishment for the person who commits a crime under a threat of duress and, at 
the time of the commission of that crime, he or she was reasonably under the apprehension of 
imminent death or a serious injury which would cause a permanent disability or mutilation of one of 
his or her organs if he or she did not submit to commit the crime (excluding murder) which he or she 
is coerced to commit.   For a person to avoid criminal liability, he or she needs not to have created 
the situation of duress or subjected himself or herself to that duress, and there should be no other 
way to avoid such duress but to commit the crime.  
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coerced choice from morally unacceptable options(96), and where circumstances 
other than the threat of serious violence or harm by another person similarly 
restrict the options available to a person, such that he or she can only avoid 
irreparable evil through the commission of some criminal act [involving a lesser 
evil], they can apply the defence of "necessity(97) or duress of circumstances". In 
effect, the only sort of duress by the action of another, recognized by law, is the 
threat of immediate death or serious personal violence where such immediate 
threat either overbears the ordinary power of human resistance or provokes 
legitimate resistance in self-defence. The only sort of "duress of circumstances" 
– or of "necessity" recognized in law is a threat of immediate death or very 
serious injury by natural disasters such as fire or earthquake.  
While the law appears to be in line with the same broad categories of 
restrictions on autonomy, it nonetheless falls down in its crudely black and white 
approach. Much of criminal activities result from social conditions, and if the 
criminal law is supposed to express and reflect individuals' way of living, then it 
should start to consider some of the deeper issues which underpin and might 
explain criminal behaviors. As Norrie points out, the existing criminal law's 
approach: 
Misses the social context that makes individual life possible, and by which 
individual actions are…mediated and conditioned. There is no getting away 
from our existence in families, neighborhoods, environment, social classes 
                                      
(96)  Clarkson C M V, Understanding Criminal Law, 2nd ed, Fontana Press, London, 1995 at p86. 
(97)  In Australia, a useful definition of the defence of necessity is provided in the case of R v Loughnan 
[1981] VR 443 at 448 by Young CJ and King J: 
[T]here are three elements involved in the defence of necessity. First, the criminal act or acts must 
have been done only in order to avoid certain consequences which would have inflicted irreparable 
evil upon the accused or upon others whom he was bound to protect…The [second] 
element…[is]…that the accused must honestly believe on reasonable grounds that he was placed in a 
situation of imminent peril…thus if there is an interval of time between the threat and its expected 
execution it will be very rarely if ever that a defence of necessity can succeed. The [third] element of 
proportion simply means that the acts done to avoid the imminent peril must not be out of proportion 
to the peril to be avoided. Put in another way, the test is: would a reasonable man in the position of 
the accused have considered that he had any alternative to doing what he did to avoid the peril? (p 
448). 
Whereas in Jordan, this defence exists in Article 89 of the JPC which states that: 
 the perpetrator of an offence is not subject to punishment if he or she carries out the conduct 
constituting the offence in response to an emergency which forced him to ward off immediately an 
immediate peril against himself or his property or against another person or his property, provided 
that he or she did not intentionally cause that peril and provided that his or her conduct is 
proportionate with the danger.  
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and politics… the basic truth of the duality of human life, as both individual 
and social, is ignored by a practice and philosophy of legal judgment in 
which context is always regarded as extrinsic to agency. Even where it is 
admitted, it as a secondary and exceptional phenomenon added on to the 
judgment…the significance of duress and necessity defences is that they 
begin to open up this otherwise hidden world within legal discourse…they 
involve a kind of threat that most will never experience. But the fear that 
stems from such situations is qualitatively no different from a range of other 
fears which may be equally efficacious for the 'ordinary reasonable man'. 
These include 'fear of economic ills, fear of displeasing others, or any other 
determinant of choice'. People stealing out of hunger, or breaking into 
property because they are homeless(98). 
3.1.2. Sociological Analysis 
In reality, there are many different forms and degrees of restrictions, many 
sorts of ways in which the actions of some affect and constrain the decisions and 
spontaneous actions of others, increasing the likelihood of criminal behaviors. 
So, on the sociological side(99) criminal law should focus upon the broad reality 
of contemporary economic life while determining the liability of individuals.  
For example, in a capitalist society, the capitalist-owners have ultimate authority, 
and they enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than others. They are interested in 
profits and in maintaining the conditions that keep their profits. They cannot 
oversee every aspect of workplace activity to ensure that these conditions prevail 
so they hire special employees who are empowered to act on their behalf in the 
day to day organization of such profit maximization. Such co-coordinators 
oversee the day to day actions of the workers – the actual producers and wealth 
generators – whose autonomy is, in consequence, hugely restricted, controlled 
and lacking in creative possibilities. They obey the co-coordinators out of fear of 
being punished or fired(100). In other words, those with limited material resources 
enjoy little autonomy or even do not have real one. 
A hierarchical division of labour within larger and more complex corporate 
                                      
(98)  Norrie, 2001 supra at p172. 
(99)  See for example, Miliband R, Divided Socities: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1991; White R & Perrone S, Crime and Social Control: An Introduction, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1997;  Croal H, Understanding White Collar Crime, Open 
University Press, Buckinham, 2001;  Mann S, Economics, Bussiness Ethics and Law, Lawbook CO, 
Sydeny, 2003;  Kuhn R & O’Lincoln, Class and Class Confilct in Australia, Longman Australia Pty 
Ltd,  Austrialia, 1996. 
(100) Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p111.  
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structures apportions tasks, empowerment, status, remuneration and quality of 
life in hierarchical order. A few at the top have excellent working conditions and 
very substantial empowerment. They are hugely autonomous in that they are 
largely free from day to day external duress, they have massive freedom of 
choice – in terms of real options in the organization of their work and leisure 
time, and they have access to a wholly different quality and quantity of 
information for rational decision making within the organization – including 
access to substantial human and mechanical information processing resources. 
The economic power of owners and higher co-coordinators gives them power to 
directly influence the political process – participating in the formulation of 
legislation and directing the day to day decision-making of the political 
leadership. So they can exert huge social and political power via the control of 
mass communications which provide the means of persuasion and ideological 
control(101)  
As has been pointed out by Mann and Al-Qudah(102) those who have 
acquired sufficient assets through inheritance or other means can live very 
comfortably with no need to work at all. They can leave the management of such 
assets to others. They can choose to do whatever work might appeal to them, or 
simply enjoy the benefits of consumption. They can study what they want, 
possess what they want, travel when and to where they want. In contrast, those in 
the middle ranks fall well below these levels of autonomy –in relation to both 
effective power and decision-making within the organization and the power of 
money outside it. The great majority, in the lower ranks, have effectively no 
power at all, within the structure or outside it. In developed countries, they 
probably do have access to basic necessities of food, clothing, accommodation 
and transport – though the increasing numbers employed on a casual or part time 
basis find it more and more difficult to make ends meet. In some developing 
countries, those on the shop floor typically toil in slave-like conditions for what 
is often significantly less than a living wage. 
Many of such individuals do not enjoy their jobs, or do not enjoy much of 
what they do at work. They work in order to get money to live. While they work 
they follow orders from others, with which they do not necessarily agree and 
they are highly vulnerable to pressure from above and below. And today, with 
high levels of chronic unemployment and underemployment, they must struggle 
harder in order to hold onto any kind of employment. In other words, the greater 
                                      
(101)  Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p111; Mann S, Economics, Bus iness Ethics and Law, Lawbook 
CO, Sydeny, 2003 at p162-163. 
(102)   Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p111-112. 
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part of their working lives consists of "economically coerced, rather than free 
action". They operate under continuous duress, and their limited incomes also 
reduce the options available to them outside the working environment. They 
suffer from long term unemployment or underemployment. But they are forced 
to accept these situations and may be driven to break the law in order to maintain 
their jobs out of fear of poverty and hunger. Government social security 
payments fail to accommodate for rents, food, clothes etc – to allow for even 
minimally decent living standards. Some do not even receive these payments and 
some are unable to make best use of them. In other words, their life options are 
severely restricted – so long as they stay within the legal economy. And powerful 
social forces of denigration and victimization work to undermine the self-esteem 
and psychological well-being of those in this group(103).   
3.1.3. Class and Crime 
The hierarchy of the social class structure can therefore be seen to map out a 
hierarchy of degrees of liberty of action, freedom of choice and effective 
deliberation, with reduced free will and increased "economic duress" further 
down the system. And such increasing duress goes a long way towards 
explaining patterns of crime amongst those lower down in the hierarchy(104). For 
some of those faced with the poverty and ignominy of long term unemployment, 
or a life of powerless drudgery with minimum respect and remuneration, a life of 
property crime or drug dealing can offer [or appear to offer] a viable and rational 
alternative. One can compare the situation here with the "legal category of 
duress" as recognized by the criminal law in both Jordan and Australia. In this 
case, duress is the threat of a wasted life that motivates the criminal choice as the 
lesser of the two evils. 
In Australia, for example, it is suggested that the two most common types of 
violent interaction identified as crimes of violence by the Australian criminal 
justice system are "confrontational violence between males" typically young and 
of marginal socio-economic status, and "violent interaction between family 
members and other intimates" both often involving alcohol(105). In the first case, 
as Mann and Al-Qudah(106) argue, we can trace a path of causal determination 
from income inequality and discrimination, through disrespect and 
powerlessness, to street violence associated with the defence of honour. The 
                                      
(103)  Mann, 2003 supra at p165-166. 
(104)  Mann, 2003 supra at p167-172 ; Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p113. 
(105)  Hogg R & Brown D, Rethinking Law and Order, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1998 at p53-58. 
(106) Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p115.  
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greater the scale of income and social power inequality, the more those at the 
bottom of the scale, experiencing comparatively greater poverty and 
powerlessness, and corresponding social disrespect, feel that they have to defend 
the vestiges of self respect they have left. Physical violence is sometimes seen as 
the only means at their disposal to do so. The greater their general powerlessness 
and lack of autonomy, the greater their sensitivity to anything seen as disrespect 
on the part of their peers.  In the second case, Hogg and Brown(107) state that "it 
would be surprising if the material stresses generated by poverty, unemployment 
and social isolation did not seriously exacerbate the ordinary, day-to-day 
tensions that arise within family relationships and produce higher levels of 
conflict and violence".  
As Mann(108) points out, in psychoanalytic terms, the poor and the powerless 
employ the defence of displacement of their anger, away from those who really 
oppress them [who remain outside the scope of their effective action] and onto 
the closer targets offered by hostile peers and family members. Otherwise, the 
anger is turned against themselves. According to Wilkinson(109) ‘except perhaps 
in revolutionary situations’, violence will always appear to be  
concentrated in poor areas and occur primarily amongst the poor 
themselves…because what counts as violence are those forms of coercion not 
sanctioned by social institutions; making people homeless by ending a 
tenancy is not an act of violence, whereas hitting the landlord…is.  
In the context of corporate criminal liability, an existing culture within a 
corporation which tolerates, provokes or even encourages law breaching 
combined with the individual pressing economic needs could lead employees 
into criminal activities as they cannot afford to lose their jobs and go hungry. 
The fear of being sacked or made redundant, deprivation, social inequality, 
poverty and discrimination, resulting from an existing corporate culture might 
well lead the employee to engage in criminal activities which he or she would 
not otherwise have done. As has been stated(110) "the relationship between 
economic circumstances and crime is evident in the fact that lack of employment 
is a key variable in who actually ends up in prison".  
 
                                      
(107)  Hogg and Brown, 1998 supra at 54. 
(108)  Mann, 2003 supra at 169. 
(109)  Wilkinson R, Mind the Gap, Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2000 at  p24 
(110)  Kuhn R & O’Lincoln, Class and Class Confilct in Australia, Longman Australia Pty Ltd,  Austrialia, 
1996 at p133. 
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Given this focus, one can see how generally meaningless and misleading is 
any idea of the "criminal mind" as "cause" of crime(111). As Mann and Al-
Qudah(112) point out were those at the top to be exposed to the same 
circumstances of those at the bottom, no doubt they would respond in similar 
fashion. Their minds are not different, but it is their social circumstances that are 
different leading to different behaviors or different treatment of the same 
behavior. Bearing the foregoing discussion in mind, the question which should 
be raised is whether the lawmakers should stretch or extend the scope of the 
theory of using an innocent or non-responsible agent to include such non-
intentional exploitation by corporations of their workers to engage criminal 
behaviors based "economic duress". Or at the minimum, should not the criminal 
law introduce new defence to allow such notion to exist within the current legal 
structure? 
3.1.4. Causation Analysis 
In both Jordan and Australia, it is a settled legal position that the theory of 
using an innocent agent applies only to situations involving intentional 
exploitation of that agent by the principal to perform the actus reus of an 
offence(113). However, some have argued for the application of this theory to 
situations involving crimes of negligence. For example, Smith(114) argues that if 
the "agent" is to be seen as no more than a conduit through which causal liability 
can flow, then, there is nothing to suggest the restriction of the theory to 
situations involving intentional usage of the agent by the principal.  As he says, 
if we accept that P had caused A to commit a crime, it does not follow that 
intention on the part of P is required and consequently a lesser mental state such 
as negligence should be sufficient to establish P's liability. Namely, where 
negligence is the relevant mens rea, the principal who with that mens rea 
"causes" another to commit an offence, the former should be held liable for its 
commission. As Smith points out, if P negligently fits a tyre to A's car causing it 
to run out of control and kills C, it can be said that P is liable for manslaughter 
                                      
(111)  Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p 122. 
(112)  Mann and Al-Qudah, 2004 supra at p 122. 
(113)  For Australia see for example White v Ridely (1978) 140 CLR 342; Hewitt (1997) 1 VR 30; Cogan 
and Leak [1975] 2 ALL ER 1059. In Jordan, although no explicit guidance exist in the JPC, legal 
commentators tend to take the position that only intentional crime can be committed by an innocent 
agent as the principal needs to intentionally use that agent o commit the crime (Alseid, 2002:375-
381 & Almajalee, 2005:292-293). 
(114) Smith K J M, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity, Oxford University Press, 
United States, 1991 at p98-103.  
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through the innocent driver A. Similarly, Almsari(115) argues that a non-
intentional offence can be committed by a principal through an innocent agent. 
According to him, if a pharmacist mistakenly adds a poisonous substance to 
medicine and gives it to a father who in good faith administers it to his ill son 
who consequently dies, then the pharmacist could be considered as a principal of 
manslaughter through the innocent father.   
Although the aim here is not to engage in a detailed discussion of causation, 
it is nonetheless important to highlight how a person’s action or inaction can be 
taken to have contributed to the acts (and consequences) of another.  The term 
"cause" can apply to both necessary and sufficient conditions, and conditions that 
are both necessary and sufficient. Most often, each of a number of necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions are called "causal" factors.  When all necessary 
conditions are present, a single necessary factor becomes sufficient to produce a 
particular result.  Where such a "final" necessary condition involves some sort of 
human action or inaction, it is more likely to be identified as the cause of that 
particular result. Absence can also be a necessary condition.  
In the context of criminal law, lawyers are familiar with necessary 
conditions (and absences) treated as causes via the so-called "but for" analysis. 
That is, where an individual (A) intentionally or negligently fails to intervene in 
another's action (P), it is possible to say that P would not have achieved his or 
her goal had (A) acted as he or she is obliged to do. Here, we can see that A's 
free abstention from doing something has contributed to the outcomes produced 
by P. Typically, we identify a range of different conditions as "individually 
necessary" and "jointly sufficient" to bring about particular consequences. In this 
sense, every event is recognized as "the result of many conditions that are jointly 
sufficient to produce it"(116). Fleming says: 
In legal inquires it does not matter if we are unable to identify all, or even 
most, of the individual elements which constitute the complex set of 
conditions jointly sufficient to produce the given consequence. The reason is 
that we are usually interested only to investigate whether one, two or perhaps 
three specific conditions [for example identified acts or omissions by the 
defendant or other participants in the accident] were causally relevant… 
whether a particular condition qualifies as a causally relevant factor will 
                                      
(115)  Almasri, A M D, ‘The Theory of The Moral Perpetrator of Crime: Comparative Study’, Thesis 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master at the University of Jordan, 1998 
at p141. 
(116) Fleming J G, The Law of Torts, 8th ed, The Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1992 at p193.  
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depend on whether it was necessary to complete a set of conditions jointly 
sufficient to account for the given occurrence(117)  
A deeper understanding of causation typically centers upon identifying and 
explaining the characteristics, powers and tendencies possessed by particular 
sorts [or natural kind] of things by virtue of their particular structure.  We must 
then consider the way in which particular powers are released or triggered to 
bring about particular sorts of results in particular sorts of situations. For 
example, by virtue of their cellular structure, seeds have the capacity to 
germinate and grow into plants- but such a power is released only in the 
"presence" of some necessary conditions such as water, appropriate substrate and 
nutrients and in the "absence" of growth restricting toxins or obstacles.   
In law, the principal causal agents are humans. Here, the crucial issue is 
whether an individual’s action or inaction has caused a particular result. Or 
whether the individual’s guilty mind has caused a particular criminal action.  
Liability on the basis of negligence does not mean that the action of the offender 
was unconscious or involuntary. Rather, as has been stated, it can be argued that 
a person who negligently causes harm could have done otherwise so long as he 
or she had the capacity to change his or her course of conduct by taking 
necessary care upon the existence of sufficient signals to alert a reasonable 
person under the same circumstances(118).  Criminal law imposes duties and 
obligations on individuals who engage various activities, and should they fail to 
observe their duties by not taking reasonable care when they have the capacity to 
do so, they should bear the responsibility for their actions.  Liability in this sense 
is referred to as "the culpability of unexercised capacity"(119).  
Applying this to crimes involving corporations, it can be argued that 
corporate liability, as a principal offender, can be established by reference to the 
doctrine of innocent agent when one (or more) of its employees commits a crime 
which he or she believes to have been caused by an existing corporate culture 
which encourages or tolerates such criminal activities with the corporation doing 
nothing to change such culture.. And when the autonomy of the employee, as 
liberty of action and freedom of choice, is restricted by such culture in the sense 
that he or she had no other alternative but to act the way he or she did.  In terms 
of causation analysis, one can see how a combination of two necessary 
conditions (that is, corporate culture and the economic duress) can together form 
                                      
(117)  Fleming, 1992 supra at p193-194. 
(118)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p198. 
(119)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p198. 
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a sufficient factor in producing particular criminal consequences by the 
employee. In other words, it is possible to trace a causal link between corporate 
negligence (through allowing such conditions to exist when having the capacity 
to change them but failing to do so) and the resultant criminal consequences. 
Arguably, the absence of such "necessary" conditions might well produce 
different outcomes.   
As the foregoing discussion reveals, an individual is deemed to be 
autonomous when his or her actions are produced by his or her free will without 
any external restrictions (autonomy as liberty of action), and when the individual 
in question has a range of "real" choices actually available to him or her in terms 
of access to material means for the realization of a certain goal. As has been 
suggested(120) a person who lacks or even does not have the necessary material 
means is not free to act upon his or her decision. From this perspective, it is 
arguable that an employee whose autonomy is restricted and limited because of 
"economic pressure" cannot be deemed to have acted freely.  
Therefore, it is suggested here that  the theory of using an innocent agent to 
commit a crime should be made applicable to form a ground of corporate 
liability in situations involving crimes committed by employees under "economic 
duress" when these offences are proved to have resulted from the exploitation of 
the workforce by a given organization. This can be made possible if the 
lawmakers are ready to accept the notion of "economic duress" as a basis for 
determining the degree of real freedom of choice exercised by the employee. 
This is crucial if the law is to take serious account of the radical disparities of 
autonomy and freedom of choice across the social class structure. It is 
acknowledged that an issue of this kind can be taken, or might be considered, 
relevant at the sentencing stage. But the real issue is whether it should be taken 
into account at a prior stage when the question of individual criminal liability is 
decided. 
3.2. An Organizational Doctrine Combined with Strict Liability 
3.2.1. The Concept of Strict Liability 
As in most other jurisdictions, in both Jordan and Australia, a presumption 
of innocence underpins the criminal process of individual liability; that is a 
person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is a basic rule of evidence in 
both jurisdictions that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the accused's 
                                      
(120)  Mappes and DeGrazia, 1996 supra at p25-28. 
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criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt(121), and the accused should be given 
the benefit of the doubt. The prosecution must persuade the court that the 
accused is guilty, and this burden of proof remains upon the prosecution 
throughout the trial, and if the prosecution fails to prove the elements of the 
crime (the actus reus and mens rea) charged no criminal liability shall be 
imposed. In contrast, the criminal liability of an individual may rest on a 
presumed "strict liability". The following discussion explains the meaning of this 
form of liability, arguing that it may be preferred in cases involving corporate 
criminal liability. 
In Australia, unlike Jordan, criminal liability can be imposed on the ground 
of strict liability in relation to statutory offences. Although a presumption of 
mens rea is presumed if the statute does not explicitly require that, it is 
nonetheless accepted that this presumption can be rebutted by the word of the 
statute(122). In   Wampfler (1987) 11 NSWLR 541 at p546, Street Chief Justice 
summarized the categories of mens rea for statutory offence as follows:   
(1) Those in which there is an original obligation on the prosecution to 
prove mens rea. 
(2) Those in which mens rea will be presumed to be present unless and 
until material is advanced by the defence of the existence of honest and 
reasonable belief that the conduct in question in not criminal in which 
case the prosecution must undertake the burden of negativing such 
belief beyond reasonable doubt. [This refers to strict liability] 
(3) Those in which mens rea plays no part and guilt is established by proof 
of the objective ingredients of the offence. 
As mentioned above, the notion of strict liability exists under the CCA, 
which provides that: 
6.1 (1) if a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence 
of strict liability: 
(a) There are no faults element for any of the physical elements of the 
offence; and 
(b) The defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available. 
                                      
(121) See Article 147/1 of the JPC; Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109. 
(122) He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 532. 
43
Al Qudat: ????????? ???????? ??????? ????? ????????? ???????? ?? ?????? ????????? : ????? ??????? ??????
Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2009
 
Dr. Mouaid Al-Qudah  
 
 












(2) If a law that creates an offence provides that strict liability applies to a 
particular physical element of the offence: 
(a) There are no fault elements for that physical element; and 
(b) The defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available in relation 
to that physical element. 
(3) The existence of strict liability does not make any other defence 
unavailable.  
According to the CCA, the term "strict liability" indicates that the offence 
for which a person may be convicted does not require a proof of any state of 
mind intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence in relation to the physical 
element of that offence. It is, however, necessary to establish that the accused has 
committed the physical element of the offence in question, and it is up to the 
accused to negate his or her liability by adducing the defence of honest and 
reasonable mistake of facts, provided that the prosecution fails to prove the 
contrary(123).  
Although it is important to retain the position of requiring a proof of mens 
rea in relation to individual responsibility, it is nonetheless presumed to be 
equally important not to require the same standard of proof as far as corporate 
criminal liability is concerned. Given the scope and seriousness of corporate 
crime, and the substantial resources available to large corporations which they 
could use and exploit to avoid scrutiny by the legal justice system, it would be 
necessary to introduce some serious methods to appropriately address this issue.  
Arguably, one of these ways is to radically reverse the burden of proof in 
such a way where corporations are required to negate their guilt for the crime 
committed. As  Mann(124) puts it "it would make sense to reduce the standard of 
proof in relation to such crime, with the state required to establish guilt on the 
balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt, or to shift the 
burden of proof onto corporations to prove their innocence". A possible conduit 
whereby this can be achieved is to combine the organizational doctrine [as 
presented above] with the notion of strict liability. As has been stated "the 
history of strict liability, for long accepted as a straightforward response to 
industrialization…many commentators recognize that corporate harms demands 
                                      
(123) Proudman v Dyman (1941) 67 CLR 536. 
(124)  Mann, 2003 supra at p201-202. 
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different types of analysis but few are bold enough to suggest that the tradition 
basis for ascribing responsibility is inadequate"(125). 
3.2.2. Arguments in Favor of Strict Liability as Ground of Corporate 
Culpability 
Various arguments can be presented in favor of strict liability in the context 
of corporate culpability. First, one of the major and practical benefits of 
rendering corporations strictly liable for their wrongdoings lies in shifting the 
burden of proof from the prosecution and placing it on the corporation itself. 
Namely, instead of requiring the prosecution to prove the mental state of the 
individuals identified within the corporation in relation to the physical element of 
an offence, it would be the task of the corporation to insulate itself from criminal 
liability by showing that all reasonable steps have been taken to prevent the 
commission of the offence in question. This is important because in most 
circumstances it is difficult or even impossible for the prosecution to prove 
"beyond all reasonable doubt" the mental involvement of the corporation in the 
commission of an offence. It has been asserted that the notion of "corporate 
culture" provides a considerable scope for raising such reasonable doubt 
especially in the case of large and well-resourced corporations(126).  
Possible difficulties which might be raised and considered hard to overcome 
might include addressing what constitutes corporate culture, whether corporate 
passive stand could amount to authorization or permission of the wrongful acts 
being committed. Establishing the existence of an implied permission to commit 
an offence may well work to cast serious doubt as to whether such notion existed 
in the corporate policy. It is also recognized that proving corporate criminality 
can be both time-consuming process with the enforcement staff being confronted 
with what amounts to a network of complexities. To highlight the practical 
difficulties of proving corporate crime, I quote two U.S prosecutors summing up 
the position by stating that 
Economic crimes are far more complex than most other federal offences. 
The events in issue usually have occurred at a far more remote time and 
over a far more extensive period. The "proof" consists not merely of 
relatively few items of real evidence but a large roomful of often obscure 
documents. In order to try the case effectively, the Assistant United 
Attorney must sometimes master the intricacies of a sophisticated business 
venture. Furthermore, in the course of doing so, he, or the agent with whom 
                                      
(125)  Wells, 2001 supra at p68,71. 
(126) Clough and Mulhern, 2002 supra at p 143-147. 
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he works, often must resolve a threshold question that has already been 
determined in most case: Was there a crime in the first place(127).  
As has been noted corporations are protected by the resources available to 
them and they can use such resources to contest prosecution, and on the grounds 
of time, efforts, cost and reduced chances of convictions, the prosecutors may be 
deterred to take the case to court(128). The justifications of the development of 
strict liability are largely efficiency-based justifications which can be explained 
by reference to the difficulties in prosecuting corporations for their violations of 
the laws(129). It has been argued that in many cases it is difficult to draw any 
inference about the offender's mental state from his or her actions(130).  Thus, it is 
arguable that placing the onus of proof upon the accused corporation instead of 
the prosecution [being required to engage in a battle of proof with large and 
powerful organizations with high possibility of failing to establish corporate 
blameworthiness] might well lead these organizations to work effectively toward 
the minimization of their potential violations of law.  
Secondly, there is the capacity theory argument. Although strict liability as a 
basis of criminal liability does not consider the actual knowledge or awareness of 
the agent, it can however be justified on a ground of a capacity theory(131). 
Criminal law imposes duties and obligations on individuals who engage in 
various activities and upon their failure to observe these duties, by not taking the 
reasonable precautions when they have the capacity to do so, the law holds them 
responsible for their actions where there are sufficient signals to alert the 
reasonable person.  By analogy, if this proposition is true in the case of 
individual responsibility, then there should be no problem in holding 
corporations criminally liable to a higher standard on the same ground given the 
capacities they have to avoid breaching their duties.  
Thirdly, there is the social welfare argument. Strict liability has often been 
regarded as being unfair or unjust. But as Ashworth(132) points out, various forms 
of harm which afflict or threaten to afflict individuals result from corporate 
activities. For example, activities involving pollution, defective products, food 
and drugs, safety at work, transport systems are all dominated by corporate 
undertakings.  And where corporations operate in a sphere which is potentially 
                                      
(127)  Citied in Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p 494. 
(128)  Mann, 2003 supra at p174. 
(129)  Quaid, 1998 supra at p109. 
(130)  Quaid, 1998 supra at 109. 
(131)  Ashworth, 2001 supra at p197-199. 
(132) Ashworth, 1999 supra at p169. 
46
Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2009, No. 37 [2009], Art. 8
https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2009/iss37/8
 
Corporate Criminal Liability Under The Criminal Laws  
 
 










dangerous to society, they should be held liable to a higher standard than 
individuals. Basically, these types of harm represent a threat to the collective 
interests of the society and affect its well-being.  Thus, the imposition of strict 
liability on corporations can be justified on the ground of protecting these 
collective interests of the society which might be said to be embodied in the 
prevention of these types of harm.  
There are numerous breaches of law that may produce undue harm and 
considerable prejudice to the public welfare because of the large number of 
persons affected by them. Thus, the conflict between social welfare and fairness 
should be resolved according to whether the offender is a private citizen or a 
corporation according to Ashworth(133). He further argues "it is wrong that 
powerless individuals should be treated more severely, in law and practice, than 
powerful corporations…the question of strict liability for companies should be 
considered afresh"(134).  Arguably, requiring corporations to exercise a higher 
standard of care by introducing the notion of strict liability could contribute to 
the reduction of the general harm and subsequently deter corporations from 
potential wrongdoings. To this effect, it has been said that the exposure of an 
offender to the prospect of punishment on the ground of merely committing the 
actus reus of the offence without requiring proof of any mental state, will of 
course have the tendency of causing the offenders to conduct themselves with a 
special degree of caution(135).  
Ashworth(136) acknowledges that it is a controversial question whether 
criminal liability without fault is an efficacious preventive means of harm, but 
according to him at least two aspects of efficacy arise. On one hand, it is easy to 
enforce no-fault offences, and on the other hand there is the preventive effect of 
liability without fault. In the later sense, the prosecution can use the threat of 
strict liability in order to secure compliance. In other words, the prosecutor with 
power to invoke strict liability can adopt what may be termed as a "compliance 
strategy" toward law enforcement aiming to secure conformity to the law without 
the need to process and penalize violators. This is because when a clear 
indication is made to corporations that any breach of the law will result in strict 
responsibility, there is a possibility that they will exercise a higher level of care 
to avoid such liability.  
                                      
(133)  Ashworth, 1999 supra at p169. 
(134)  Ashworth, 1999 at p175. 
(135)  Gillies P, Criminal Law, 4th ed, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1997 at p88. 
(136)  Ashworth, 1999, supra at p 169-170. 
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3.3. Corporate Punishment  
So far the discussion has been centred upon the theoretical analysis of 
corporate accountability. The enforcement of such accountability and the type of 
sanctions that may be applied is another relevant issue associated with corporate 
criminal liability. Traditionally, theories including rehabilitation, deterrence and 
retribution have been offered as a justification for punishment(137). Various 
retributive assumptions, based on the individualistic conception of liability, are 
deemed to underpin criminal liability. These include, for example, that 
punishment presupposes individuals and not corporations, retribution is 
preconditioned on fault, and the application of punishment to corporations 
violates the principle of desert(138). Issues of this kind, are highlighted above, and 
thus the following discussion maps out some of the key points concerning the 
deterrence theory and considers possible punishments that might be applied to 
corporations.  
Starting with the question of whether the goals of punishment are achievable 
or not in the context of corporate liability, Fisse and Braithwaite(139) state that 
various assumptions are made in relation to the deterrence theory which are not 
necessarily sound as far as corporate punishment is concerned. The first 
assumption presumes that only human agents can be capable of responding to the 
deterrent effect of punishment.  The authors assert that it is often said that 
criminal liability presupposes human choice and therefore the deterring effect of 
punishment is directed exclusively to individuals. Penalties directed to 
corporations seek to deter a wide range of individual associates from engaging in 
criminal behaviors. But sometimes it is impossible to successfully prosecute the 
individuals who are directly involved in the offence, and those who may have 
influenced the commission of that crime may fall outside the scope of criminal 
complicity or other head of liability. Thus, the punishment of collectivities with 
the view of inducing compliance with the law by human agents is consistent with 
the deterrence hypothesis. The threat of corporate punishment can form a 
substitute for the threat of individual punishment in situations involving 
difficulties of imposing punishment directly on individual personnel. 
A second assumption postulates that there is no warrant for punishing 
corporate entities in the absence of corporate cogent action. The same authors(140) 
                                      
(137)  Tebbit M, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction, Routledge, London, 2000 at p165; Alseid, 2002 
supra at p646-647; Brown et al , 2002 supra at 1379. 
(138) Fisse and Braithwaite, 1998 supra at p502.  
(139)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1998 supra at p488. 
(140)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1998 supra at p490. 
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point out that it is said to be difficult to justify corporate punishment because it is 
not possible to account for corporate conduct in terms of biological and 
psychological characteristics.  This is because corporations cannot intend actions 
and their criminality cannot be explained.  Contrary to this view, the authors 
assert that if we lack an adequate theory of corporate action, we also lack an 
adequate theory of individual action within the corporation. In cases involving 
corporate liability, corporate actions can be allied with corporate decision-
making process. Considering the work of Simeon Kriesberg, modeling the nature 
of decision-making within corporations, Fisse and Braithwaite state that Simeon 
specifies three models of corporate decision-making. First, the rational actor 
model which postulates a unitary, rational decision-making process derived from 
neoclassical economic theories of the firm. According to Fisse and Braithwaite  
penalties imposed upon the decision-making unit and the corporate entity are 
effective when directed to particular values such as profit, prestige and stability 
which a rational actor of the corporation seeks to maximize. 
The second model, according to Simeon, is the organizational model which 
refers to the company as a constellation of loosely allied decision-making units 
such as marketing groups, manufacturing units and research and development 
staff. All these parts have their own role and responsibility which is governed by 
standard operating processes as established by written organizational rules. Fisse 
and Braithwaite note that this model suggests that punishment should be directed 
to individual personnel who are in a position to enact and supervise the standard 
rules. Thirdly, there is the bureaucratic politics model which views "corporations 
as a bargaining game involving a hierarchy of players and a maze of formal and 
informal channels through which decisions are made and implemented". 
According to this model sanctions are primarily imposed against the individual 
participants and secondarily against the corporation.  
Fisse and Braithwaite(141) argue that although it may be impossible to 
pinpoint which model most closely corresponds to the realities of decision-
making within a given corporation, nonetheless there is a need for sanctions 
which are capable of reflecting the implications of different models.   It may be 
difficult to arrive at an acceptable theory of corporate action, but it is at least 
possible to devise a multi-purpose sanctions like punitive injunction and thereby 
hedge our theoretical bets according to them. 
A third assumption about the deterrence theory of punishment is that 
corporations are not wrongdoers to be punished but entities to be reformed.  But 
                                      
(141)  1988 supra at 492. 
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contrary to the individualistic perceptions, the conditions of corporations do not 
preclude them from being viewed and punished as wrongdoers.  And 
corporations are not supposed to be punished in a negative manner by imposing 
fines, dissolutions or temporal ban of activities. They can be punished positively 
in such a way whereby institutional reform can be achieved.  That is, if such 
reform is necessary, the blameworthiness of a corporate defendant can justify the 
imposition of a punitive injunction requiring organizational reform which is 
more exacting than those warranted by way of merely remedial injunctive 
relief(142).  
A forth assumption presumes that it is impossible to punish corporations in 
an effective manner, and deterrence of corporate crime can be achieved by 
punishing the individual persons who are responsible.  Fisse and Braithwaite 
(143)assert that this assumption underestimates the difficulties involved in 
enforcing individual liability within the corporation. According to them, 
difficulties of this kind include, for example, enforcement overload, 
expendability of personnel within the corporation, corporate safe-harboring of 
individual suspects, the prosecutors being confronted with what amounts to a 
network of complexities such as tortuous legislations, complex accounting 
practices and a lot more of an obscure documentations in addition to the time-
consuming nature of corporate crime investigation. One possible way of 
responding to difficulties of this kind is to extend the criminal liability to 
"corporate entities" in the hope that they will undertake internal disciplinary 
action and impose individual liability as a matter of private policing.   
The individualistic belief that it is impossible to account for an effective 
corporate punishment rests on the ground that only fines or other monetary 
penalties are applicable to corporations according to Fisse and Braithwaite (at 
499). The effect of this belief is evident in the CCA and the JPC which allows 
only these types of sanctions to be imposed upon the commission of an offence 
by a corporation. For example, Article 74(3) of the JPC states that:  
"Non-natural’" persons can only be punished with fine and confiscation. And 
if the law specifies a primary punishment other than fine, that punishment 
shall be substituted with fine which should be applied against the "non-
natural" persons in accordance with the rules as stated in Articles 22 to 24[of 
the JPC]. 
In Australia, as mentioned above, section 12(2) of the CCA provides that: 
                                      
(142)  Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988 supra at p493.  
(143)  1988 supra at p494-499. 
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 (2) A body corporate may be found guilty of any offence, including one 
punishable by imprisonment. 
But Section (4B) of the Crime Act 1914 (Cth) enables a fine to be imposed 
for offences that only specify imprisonment as a penalty. 
Fisse and Braithwaite (at p499) argue that it is "short-sighted to suppose that 
more suitable forms of sanctions cannot be devised" to deal with corporate 
criminality.  The authors acknowledge that corporate entities cannot be sent to 
jail and the traditional sanctions used against them are usually of a monetary 
nature which tends to be regarded as a minor cost of doing business. But in line 
with their idea of organizational blameworthiness discussed above, they argue 
for new patterns of criminal punishment including equity fines (stock dilution), 
probation and punitive injunctions and community service.  According to them 
one promising possibility is corporate probation as taken up by the Crimes Act 
1900 (NSW) and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Brown et al, 2001:485).  In Jordan, 
the JPC allows the imposition of what is known as "precautionary measures" 
upon the conviction of a corporation for the commission of an offence. These 
include the temporal suspension of business license and liquidation. Article (36) 
provides that: 
It is permitted to suspend any syndicate or company or association or any 
organization, except the public administration institutions, if a felony or a 
misdemeanour punishable by at least two years imprisonment is committed by its 
mangers or one of its managing members or its representatives or employees 
using one of its means or with the intention of benefiting it. 
Article (37) sets out the condition for the dissolution of a given organization 
as follows: 
The dissolution of the above-mentioned organizations is permitted in 
situations similar to those mentioned in the above Article: 
A. If the organization does not comply with the legal conditions that 
underpin its establishment 
B. If the aim behind its establishment contravenes the laws or if the 
organization is actually intends to do so 
C. If the organization contravenes the enacted legal rules under the threat of 
cessation 
D. If a final judgment is being laid down, by which the organization is 
suspended, which has not exceeded five years.       
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Article (38) articulates the requirements of suspension and the consequences 
of corporate liquidation in the following terms: 
1. An organization can be suspended for a period of one month to two years, 
and the suspension involves the cessation of the organization’s business 
activities, regardless of changing its name, managers or the managing 
members. A suspension also prevents abandoning/transferring the 
premises to another person without prejudice to the rights of individuals 
with good faith. 
2. Dissolution entails the liquidation of the organization’s assets, with its 
managers or the managing members and every person who is responsible 
for the commission of the crime losing the eligibility to establish a 
similar organization or to act as its manager(144).  
Arguably, the type of measurement recognized under the JPC [although not 
labeled as punishment] can, if strictly applied, offer an effective way to deter 
corporate criminality. The probationary conditions and the punitive injunctions 
as suggested by Fisse and Braithwaite (at p501) also offer a means for 
overcoming the limitations of fine and other monetary penalties against corporate 
wrongdoings. One possible advantage of this method is to encourage 
corporations to develop and implement their own internal disciplinary measures 
in such a way whereby individual responsibility can be achieved within 
corporations   The authors suggest a mechanism for enforcing corporate 
accountability which rests on restructuring corporate liability so as to require 
corporations causing harm to "react and implement their own disciplinary 
measures" under court supervision. They state that:  
Where the actus reus of an offence is proved to have been committed by or 
on behalf of a corporation, the court, if equipped with a suitable statutory 
injunctive power, could require the company (a) to conduct its own inquiry 
as to who was responsible within the organization, (b) to take internal 
disciplinary measures against those responsible, and (c) to return a report 
detailing the action taken. If the corporate defendant returned a report 
demonstrating that due steps had been taken to discipline those responsible 
then corporate criminal liability would not be imposed. [But] if the reaction 
                                      
(144)  Article (39) provides punishments for not complying with the above mentioned rules stating that: 
"The violation of the above-mentioned rules is punishable by imprisonment from one to six months 
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of the company was inexcusably deficient then both the company and its 
top mangers would be criminally liable for their failure to comply with the 
order of the court. The range of punishments for corporate defendants 
would include…equity fines (stock dilution), probation… court-ordered 
adverse publicity, community service, and punitive injunctive sentences… 
the strategy here is to rely on the good faith of corporations while at the 
same time to make it plain that lack of good faith will be severely punished 
(p511-13).   
It is acknowledged by Fisse and Braithwaite that a more development of the 
proposal is needed to increase the successful chance of implementations as there 
is a whole range of matters which need to be mopped out within the paradigm of 
enforcing corporate liability. But due consideration cannot be given to these 
issues in the available pages of this paper. There is no doubt that corporate 
criminal liability is a complicated matter involving various competing theories 
with no single broadly accepted theory of corporate blameworthiness. And as 
Wells(145) says, "the development of corporate criminal liability is woven from a 
number of interweaving strands and the resulting cloth is uneven". 
4. Conclusion 
This paper sought to provide a comparative account of corporate criminal 
liability under the criminal laws of both Jordan and Australia. Central to this 
purpose was to determine how both jurisdictions can inform each other in 
relation to any potential law reform on this contentious issue. Based on the 
analysis undertaken, it has been shown that, in both jurisdictions, the notion of 
individual autonomy forms the basic tenet of individual criminal culpability the 
adoption of which was seen to be problematic in relation to corporate 
responsibility. It was highlighted that a similar approach to corporate criminal 
liability is adopted under the laws of Jordan and Australia as far as the question 
of vicarious liability and the identification doctrine are concerned. That is, under 
both laws, corporations are held liable for crimes committed by their employees, 
representative or managers [the guiding mind of the company as laid down in 
Tesco]. As stated above, the current theory of corporate criminal liability under 
the JPC still focuses upon the individuals who make the organization. But given 
the limitations of such approach, it was argued that serious consideration of 
corporate liability entails moving beyond this unsatisfactory notion of 
individualism as the ground of such culpability because it fails to capture the 
collective nature of corporate responsibility. 
                                      
(145)  Wells, 2001, supra at  p85. 
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Comparatively, in Australia, various possible approaches have been offered 
to "directly" address corporate collective blameworthiness. Solutions of this kind 
involved the introduction of the doctrine of the aggregation of fault, which has 
been criticized as providing another form of vicarious liability, and the 
organizational doctrine which seeks to reflect corporate collective 
blameworthiness. As has been seen above, this doctrine is regarded as an 
advanced step toward a more coherent doctrine of corporate "direct" culpability 
than the identity and aggregation doctrines as it seeks to reflect the socially 
organized reality of corporations. This model of corporate blameworthiness as 
developed by Fisse and Braithwaite incorporates key ingredients including new 
ideas about corporate intentionality, corporate capacity, corporate structure, 
corporate culture, corporate reactive fault and new mechanism for enforcing 
corporate liability with new patterns of corporate punishment including punitive 
injunctions and corporate probation. Drawing on the foregoing comparative 
analysis, it can be suggested that a separate notion of corporate blameworthiness 
would constitute a valuable addition to the current theory of corporate criminal 
liability in Jordan.  As noted above, in Australia, this notion has been 
incorporated in the CCA, and arguably, any future law reform of corporate 
criminal liability under the JPC could be informed by the principles established 
in the CCA as stated above.  
The analysis in this paper also raises some important issues for lawmakers 
to take into account in the future. That is, while the laws in Jordan and Australia 
appear to be in line with the same broad restrictions of freedom of the will as 
identified by moral philosophers, they depart from such approach in certain 
significant aspects. In particular, they adopt a black and white approach which 
does not reflect the complexity of the real world by overlooking the radical 
disparities of autonomy and real freedom of choice across the social structure. 
Thus, in the context of corporate liability, the foregoing analysis suggests that a 
deeper understanding of corporate "culture" and the various "economic" 
restrictions on the autonomy of the employees resulting with the greater part of 
their working lives consisting of "coerced" rather than "free" actions entails a re-
examination of the current limits of the criminal laws so as to allow a radical 
restructuring of corporate liability. 
To this effect, the paper used the notion of corporate "culture" to argue for 
extending the scope of the theory of committing an offence by an innocent or 
non-responsible agent so as to allow the attribution of criminal responsibility to 
corporations as principal offender for crimes committed by their non-
autonomous employees on basis of "economic duress". That is, this theory 
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should not be confined to its current "intentional" limits under the laws of both 
Jordan and Australia. Rather, it should be extended to include situations 
involving crimes committed by a non-autonomous employee under "economic 
duress" when these offences are proven to have been "caused" by corporate 
"negligent" exploitation of the workforce. The paper also suggests that for a 
more effective approach to corporate liability both jurisdictions should combine 
the organizational doctrine with the notion of strict liability, and various, 
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